

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

No. 907.

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
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
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V. 160

EDITORIAL NOTE.

AS the Paper Controller has been compelled to make further restrictions in the supply of paper, this issue of "The Contemporary Review" has been reduced to 80 pages, but each page contains eight more lines. It may be necessary to make another reduction in the number of pages in the following issues. In order to mitigate the severity of the rationing of paper the Editors of "The Contemporary Review" have made arrangements from the August issue to increase the type area of each page. By this and other economies of space they hope to supply four-fifths of the reading matter hitherto supplied.

PARLIAMENT AND THE WAR.

THE parliamentary revolution that took place when the Chamberlain Government was displaced in May 1940 is now sufficiently a matter of the past to enable a survey to be made of the functioning of the House of Commons and the Government since. Passions which were deeply aroused at the time have now subsided and there is hardly a kick left in the supporters of the disastrous régime which existed from 1931 for nine years.

The way in which the principal Municheers have been dealt with is typical of the gentle peaceful methods of British political life. Liquidation by courtesy was the rule. The sack which Lord Simon received was a soft one and placed him in one of the highest and most dignified positions in the State, where he presides admirably over the proceedings of the House of Lords whether operating as a legislative or judicial body, but he has now nothing whatever to do with the conduct of public affairs or the direction of the war. The same applies to Sir Samuel Hoare, who has been really successful in the congenial task of appeasement which conditions in Madrid offer at the present time. Lord Halifax, though nominally a member of the War Cabinet, obviously comes within the same category. His appointment served two purposes—a difficult position in the Foreign Office was relieved and opportunities for high national service, acceptable to the United States, were afforded to him. Sir Thomas Inskip again is very appropriately placed as Lord Chief Justice. These were among the persons whose activities were so much criticised, but we can now only admire the good work they are doing in appropriate spheres.

I sometimes ask people in the Services what Ministers in

the present Government are known by name, and I often find that the only one they can think of is Mr. Churchill. This is a good indication of his pre-eminence—he towers above them all and is bearing his immense burden with zest, good health and inexhaustible courage. He is the most temperamental of our Ministers, showing clearly by facial expression what he is thinking and feeling as incidents occur in the House, and also giving some indication of the trend of the war from day to day. Whatever dissatisfaction there may be with some of his Ministers, no one wishes to displace him, or can think of any effective alternative. It is none the less an amazing situation that the man who was cold-shouldered and distrusted by his own party for so many years, and who could count on only one completely loyal supporter, Mr. Brendan Bracken, is now the supreme master of us all.

Proposals are put forward from time to time that, following the precedent set by Mr. Lloyd George (himself now presumably too old for sustained intellectual work) in the last war, the Prime Minister should have associated with him a Cabinet composed of men who have no departmental duties and can devote the whole of their time to planning and supervising the conduct of the war. The real answer to this is that we already have such a body in existence but that it does not function any too well, for in addition to Mr. Churchill we have Mr. Attlee, Mr. Greenwood, Sir John Anderson and Lord Beaverbrook all without departments. It would seem that these men, or some of them, are not of the calibre for the sort of job that was carried out twenty-three years ago by Lord Milner, Field-Marshal Smuts and others.

The presence of some Dominion Ministers in the Cabinet would be most valuable, but Mr. Menzies has a majority of one, and in South Africa there is a powerful Opposition. These are the practicable obstacles in the way.

Mr. Attlee, as Leader of the House, has efficiently carried out his duties, making from time to time spirited interventions in debates and being generally accessible, hard-working and clear-minded. He does his work to the full limit of his powers, and it is not his fault if these powers do not qualify him to fill the rôle of Deputy Prime Minister, controlling with an iron hand all the home aspects of war policy.

In the case of Mr. Greenwood, again no one would contend that the work which is allocated to him now of preparing, with a small staff, for the world after the war, is quite all that might be asked of a member of the War Cabinet.

Sir John Anderson has a powerful administrative mind and political courage, and would seem to fit in usefully.

It is yet to be seen how Lord Beaverbrook, the latest recruit, will function as the supervisor of the departments in which he was recently one of the combatants. His generally isolationist outlook is not a recommendation, but it may be

that his well-known if unorthodox methods of drive, and the immense energy he generates, will now play their part to full national advantage. Many feel that Mr. Amery freed from his present duties would be a valuable addition to the above—he has the necessary qualities.

Three other members of the Cabinet remain—Mr. Eden is far the best Foreign Secretary available, though his star certainly does not shine as brightly as in his old League days.

Sir Kingsley Wood's appointment as Chancellor of the Exchequer was not well received, but it must be said that he has made a success of his work at the Treasury. All his arts of approachableness, conciliation and persuasion have been brought into play; he has had the good sense to listen to wise advice (and there is some very wise advice available at the Treasury now) and to overcome obstacles by removing them from his path. These tactics as illustrated during the progress of the War Damage Bill have considerably raised his prestige. So has the present Finance Bill.

The remaining member of the War Cabinet is Mr. Bevin, a formidable figure, with a pleasing knack of blurting out home truths in his speeches from time to time. After a life's work devoted to most successful trade union organisation, it was difficult for him in the twinkling of an eye to divest himself of all this, and the criticism is made that he still looks at things too much from the point of view of a trade union secretary. What is required now is drastic action involving the use of compulsion, and this is contrary to his whole life's approach. While Minister of Labour, however, though he is hardly the god-like figure he was claimed to be at the time of his appointment, he is bound to remain a most powerful and vigorous asset to the Government.

Mr. Alexander is in the right place as First Lord of the Admiralty—he is deeply devoted to the Service, thoroughly understands it and has its confidence. His interventions in debate have been effective and forthright, though it must be said of all three Service Ministers that they are subsidiary to the Prime Minister as Minister of Defence.

Sir Archibald Sinclair is making a very good Secretary of State for Air, and indeed the one criticism that one hears of him is that he is so absorbed by the work of his great department that too little is seen of him in the House of Commons or heard of him in the country. As Leader of the Liberal Party he is entitled to consultation on all important political issues that arise, and there are many of his supporters who will not be satisfied until he takes his place as a member of the War Cabinet alongside the leaders of the other two Parties. The practical difficulties of bringing this about at the moment are appreciated for he is one of three Service Ministers, but national unity will not be complete until he takes his part in direct intimate control of every aspect of the war.

Captain Margesson looks like making an able Secretary of State for War; he has administrative gifts which made him a very good Chief Whip, many will think too good, and he has shown an openness of mind, accessibility, quickness and firmness of action which speak well for his conduct of the office. He was also ripe for a change of occupation.

That agile and persuasive child of London, Mr. Herbert Morrison, with his intimate knowledge of local government, is well placed at the Home Office, but the country would willingly "go to it" with more rapid stride.

One of the most successful of the newcomers to the Government is Sir Andrew Duncan, who perfectly understands the problems he has to deal with; he has a good House of Commons manner, is simple, modest and clear-headed and inspires a high degree of confidence.

Another newcomer, Captain Oliver Lyttelton, is overcoming his early diffidence and bringing more into play his excellent personal qualities, which include a keen sense of humour. His clothing rationing scheme shows courage and imagination, and has met with popular approval, largely by reason of the fact that the country is prepared for, and expects, drastic measures to be applied to it in connection with the total effort that the situation requires.

One of the most successful of new Ministers is Mr. Dalton at the Ministry of Economic Warfare; his important work has largely to be carried on and accounted for in an atmosphere of secrecy, and he is dependent on the strength of other departments, such as the Admiralty, for putting his plans into operation, but within the limits of what is possible he has applied ruthless and uncompromising resistance to all efforts to feeding or supplying the enemy. In this work he is ably supported by his thoroughly competent Under-Secretary, Mr. Dingle Foot.

Reference must be made to the unhappy Ministry of Information which, despite the high qualities and fine record of its Minister and Under-Secretary, Mr. Duff-Cooper and Mr. Harold Nicolson, still continues as from its inception to meet with general disfavour. It almost looks as if nothing could be done with its present organisation and personnel, and that the only hope lies in a complete extinction of the department and its resurrection under another form with different powers and staff.

An excellent recruit to high office has been found in Col. Moore-Brabazon, now Minister of Aircraft Production, a quick able mind, singularly broad and free in outlook—no red tape will hold him up for an instant. At last his talents have been appreciated.

Amongst other Under-Secretaries two may be mentioned who have shown high ability in the performance of their duties, both of them representing departments with the Minister in

the House of Lords ; I refer to Col. J. J. Llewellyn, who until recently was at the Ministry of Aircraft Production, and Major Lloyd George at the Ministry of Food. The latter has to deal with a very large number of parliamentary questions, and his manner is a model of the right way to do it—instead of trying to score debating points and avoid the issue, he endeavours to give a clear, courteous and informative answer in every case, and it is evident that he thoroughly understands what he is talking about.

Apart from the sometimes strange physical conditions under which Parliament is operating there are also the very unusual political circumstances in which the actual Opposition is reduced to three members of the Independent Labour Party, though no one has qualified for the £2,000 a year as yet. It should be added that in addition there is a limited number of Labour Members who, as Pacifists, are opposed to all war and find themselves in a very difficult position. As a rule they keep quiet and abstain from divisions, nor do they claim to represent their constituents. The Opposition Front Bench is a strange assembly of ex-Ministers of all parties, including at times Government Whips, though I can never understand why. In addition there are the elected members of the Labour Party Executive. For formal and ceremonial purposes Mr. Lees-Smith is the first spokesman from these quarters, and he is followed on the same basis by Sir Percy Harris as Chief Whip of the Liberal Party. After this the Front Opposition Bench may produce speeches showing varying degrees of confidence from such different points of view as those of Lord Winterton, Mr. Shinwell, Sir Herbert Williams, Mr. Garro Jones, Mr. Kenneth Lindsay, Mr. Noel Baker, and Mr. James Griffiths. The Prime Minister has made reference to the development of a “nucleus Opposition,” and it would seem that the persons he had in mind were Mr. Hore-Belisha, Mr. Shinwell and Lord Winterton, who have expressed strong views from time to time on various deficiencies of Government action. Mr. Hore-Belisha, of course, speaks with considerable authority as an ex-Member of the War Cabinet, and he does not hesitate to express in forceful and pointed language the dissatisfaction which has been felt in the country in connection with different speeches, such as the evacuation of Greece and Crete. His criticism cannot be met wholly by a reference to his own failure in the past as a member of previous Governments to provide the necessary war equipment, or by reason of the fact that he himself is probably not very unwilling to resume office. In the same way Mr. Shinwell would doubtless have no objection to co-operating in the Government in a suitable office, but this does not remove from his powerful and impassioned episodes their element of truth and wisdom. The Prime Minister is a human being with faults like everybody else, he likes to have his own way and does not particularly

enjoy criticism, especially when it tends to be barbed. He is impulsive, emotional and not always right in his reactions, but he is so infinitely superior to any possible alternative and embodies so completely the spirit of the nation at this moment, that the House of Commons is prepared to overlook and put up with any excess of exuberance that may occasionally be displayed.

Nothing has stood out during recent months more to the credit of British institutions than the fact that speeches have been made by Mr. Maxton and his colleagues and one or two others strongly hostile to the whole war movement, its aims and objects; although under present conditions the sentiments expressed must often be deeply wounding to the vast majority of the House, they are always listened to with complete tolerance and goodwill, and their authors are regarded in every respect as friends and colleagues who are fully justified in giving expression to their sincere beliefs.

Some controversy has arisen as to the exact duties of a Member of Parliament in time of war, and this came to a head through the appointment of Mr. MacDonald as High Commissioner for Canada while retaining his seat in the House. There appeared to be no obvious reason for the latter, and a Select Committee is considering the whole problem. One thing, however, is clear; it is an immense advantage to the House to have amongst its Members those who hold commissions in the three Services and serve actively on the various war fronts. They are able to step, as it were, from the field of battle, the anti-aircraft or searchlight unit to the "famous floor" and give at first hand an account of their experiences and those with whom they have been serving. In the debates, for example, after the evacuation of Dunkirk, many Members so intervened in a manner that was most effective and deeply moving.

We tried the experiment on one occasion of a free vote of the House when the subject of the opening of Sunday theatres was discussed, resulting in the rejection of the proposal. This was quite unexpected by the Government, and is not likely to encourage any similar tests in future. Because of the openness and unusual nature of the debate, it was extremely interesting and seemed to show that deep down in the instincts of the British people there is a profound belief in the maintenance of the weekly day of rest, associated as it is with the traditions of religion. Though considerable inroads had been made on Sunday observation, it was felt that at that moment, on that issue, there was an opportunity of saying that there was no reason why it should go further.

From time to time efforts have been made to persuade the Government to make some statement in general terms on War and Peace Aims, though it is realised that nothing of a detailed or specific nature is possible. Those who raised this

matter did so in the belief that one of our most powerful weapons in winning the war would be to bring home to the German people the fact that their struggle is hopeless and useless and that a tolerable life awaits them if they lay down their arms. In combination with the pressure of the blockade and the growing intensification of the R.A.F. attacks, German morale will ultimately and suddenly break down. No one visualises the British Army landing on the Continent and driving back by force of arms alone the German hosts. Recent statements by Lord Halifax and Mr. Eden do go some way to define our objects, but it seems difficult to persuade the Prime Minister to take much interest in this side of the war machine—he is so occupied and fascinated by the drama of the physical combat, that other things tend to be crowded out of the picture unless by some means they are forced upon his attention. He does not take kindly to critics whom he suspects of being secretly unfriendly and is inclined to make personal debating points in replies, but to those of whose loyalty to him he has no doubt he is much more prepared to listen. It is realised that many mistakes have been made both in small matters and in great, that the nation is a long way from being wholly prepared for war and that much greater efforts are required and would willingly be made by the nation. The Government is a long way behind the House of Commons and the country, who in many spheres would respond to far more determined action. Nothing can diminish the magnificent leadership of Mr. Churchill, or destroy confidence in him personally in that sense, but the same does not apply to some other Members of his Government, and he will certainly be expected to make changes as experience shows the desirability, regardless of personal considerations, and not to pay too much heed to that most generous and human quality of his, loyalty to those with whom he is and has been working; the one test must be fitness for the office at this moment of supreme national crisis.

GEOFFREY MANDER.

SYRIA, PALESTINE AND EGYPT.

THE move into Syria of Free French troops, supported by British Imperial forces, has a many-sided significance. But let it be made clear at the outset that this is no assault on the forces of Marshal Pétain; it is an action directed against the Axis forces which the Vichy Government have allowed to enter Syrian territory contrary to their previous pledges. It is also an action to prevent further Axis forces from establishing in Syria a base from which to attack Egypt, encircle Turkey, and acquire oil from Iraq. The Government of Vichy have nobody but themselves to blame;

and the Free French with their British Imperial allies are marching with a perfectly clear conscience. Every true Frenchman and the great majority of the Arab population should welcome our arrival as their only hope of early deliverance.

First and foremost, our object in making this move is to protect Egypt from attack in the east. The line of approach to the Nile valley by way of Syria and Palestine must appeal to the enemy for several reasons, although the transport of his troops to Syria, and their maintenance there, must be a hazardous operation. Except for the Sinai desert, the road communications are good. There is railway communication of varying gauge* the whole way from Aleppo, Damascus or Beyrouth to the Suez Canal and beyond, although there is no direct line between Beyrouth and Haifa. There is no water difficulty, and the climate is suitable for military operations even in mid-summer. Oil is near at hand, and by obtaining this oil the enemy would be depriving us of its use. By using this route towards Egypt the enemy could at the same time seize Iraq and the ports of the Persian Gulf, thereby getting near to more oil and cutting off Turkey from her outlet in the south. Were this to happen, Turkey would be in a most difficult position to resist Axis demands, whatever they might be. Among other points likely to appeal to the German High Command is the fact that the Suez Canal is on the eastern side of the natural obstacle created by the Egyptian Delta. In the east there is no obstacle to prevent mechanised vehicles reaching Port Fuad, as the approach to the Canal from this direction is open desert. When these conditions are compared with the western approach through hundreds of miles of desert, with all the difficulties of water, oil, and a merciless sun, not to mention Tobruk and bombardment from the sea, the Syrian route looks more attractive. The question disturbing the German High Command must be that of sea and air transport to Syria from Greece, Crete, Rhodes, and the Dodecanese. But the prize in the east would be so valuable to Hitler that I doubt if he can resist it. This is one of the reasons why we have marched into Syria to forestall the German designs on that country. This, however, is not to say that the Axis will not attack through Libya. They probably will do so unless we take the initiative and attack them first.

Strategically, our occupation of Syria would place us in a first-rate position for the protection of Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan and Cyprus, apart from the benefit to Egypt and Turkey. In Iraq the recent Axis attempt to stir up trouble must have some aftermath of unsettled conditions. While

* The Syrian railway from Turkey through Aleppo to Rayak is standard gauge, also the Palestine railways. The Hedjaz railway, with its branch to Haifa, is 1.05 metre gauge. The Beyrouth-Rayak-Damascus railway is also narrow gauge.

this may not be apparent on the surface, it is there all the same. For this reason, if for no other, it is important for us to prove to the Iraqis that we can protect them, and that their interests are bound up with our victory. It would be disastrous if the Iraqis came to think that our interest in them was solely confined to the oil we can get out of their country. If they keep their side of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty, we must keep ours. It is also as well to remember that trouble in Iraq can rapidly spread to Iran, where there are many German and Italian agents or whatever they like to call themselves. At the moment these oil-producing countries are inflammable in more senses than one, and there is now a railway from the Caspian through Teheran to the Persian Gulf. The Red Sea and Persian Gulf are the doorways to a large part of the Arab world, whom we have assured of our desire to see Arab unity and independence. In this Iraq plays a vital part, and her security depends on Syria.

Apart from being next-door to Egypt, Palestine has a special significance. Here is a land sacred to Christian, Moslem and Jew, which has been entrusted to the safe keeping of Great Britain. We are also responsible for the Jewish National Home and for the Arab peoples of Palestine and Transjordan. Should this region fall into the hands of the enemy, it would be a serious disaster from so many points of view that everything possible has to be done to avoid such a calamity. The repercussions of what happens in the Holy Land are world-wide. There is also the importance to the Navy of the port of Haifa, where the Palestine branch of the Iraq pipe line reaches the sea. The position of Cyprus, on the other hand, will be completely reversed, if we succeed in occupying Syria. With the enemy in control of Syria, Cyprus would be another Crete; but, with an Allied occupation of the Syrian aerodromes, any Germans who succeeded in landing in Cyprus would be in a most unpleasant position.

Another important aspect of the Syrian move is that it should bring us in direct contact with Turkey. Not only should this open up a new line of communications for the Turks in case of need, but should also strengthen Turkey's position morally as well as materially. Hitherto the Turks have been in a somewhat isolated position, which has perhaps given rise to a policy of detachment even to their detriment. They probably thought our co-operation from across the sea of doubtful value in view of what happened in Greece and again in Crete. That they have all along been determined to defend their country against aggression there is no doubt; but, when almost surrounded by potential enemies, they were not going to move unless they were driven to it by direct action by the Axis Powers. Should we succeed in occupying the whole of Syria, this position would be completely changed. The Turks would then have behind them, and in close contact,

the whole Allied resources of the Middle East. This would place them in a much stronger position *vis-à-vis* the Axis Powers for discussion as well as for military action. The nightmare of encirclement would vanish, and Turkey would find herself part of a solid block extending from Syria right down into the heart of Africa. Among the great advantages of our Syrian position, from which Turkey would benefit, are the many lines of communications by which we could be reinforced with men and equipment. Besides the Mediterranean sea route from Egypt, there is the land route from the Suez Canal through Palestine; the land route from the Red Sea via Akaba and Transjordan; and the desert route from Iraq and the Persian Gulf. By these means resources could be obtained from India, East Africa and Egypt, only to mention the more immediate sources of supply. There is, therefore, good reason to think that the importance of linking up with Turkey was among the more important factors taken into account.

A significant aspect of the Allied advance is the lead taken by the Free French forces. This must have a considerable effect on the French people when the news penetrates through to them. They will then realise that General de Gaulle's Free French movement is one not only of sentiment but of action. The more French troops and civil servants co-operate with us on our arrival, the greater will be the effect of this move on the people of France. And not only on the people of France, but on French people all the world over who are sick to death of what has been happening at Vichy. It could not fail to influence the French colonies and the people of French North Africa. By so doing the situation created should make the Vichy Government's position more difficult both with the people of unoccupied France and with the German authorities. In the United States the very fact that we have taken the initiative has already created an increased feeling of confidence. Continued retreats and withdrawals have a worse effect outside this country than they have within it. Here we either view the war in its wider sense and in its true perspective, or we put implicit trust in Mr. Churchill's genius. A great many of us do both. But we cannot expect the people of the United States, and more so those of foreign countries, to take our setbacks in quite the same philosophical way. It would not be human or natural if they did. For this reason among others, the taking of the initiative from time to time is a valuable contribution to the efficacy of our delaying action.

To the people of Syria the Free French forces bring an assurance of national independence, an ideal for which they have striven for many years. This in itself should have a good reception throughout the Arab world, especially in view of the British Government's declaration in favour of Arab unity and independence, and the declaration of the British Ambassador

in Cairo in support of General Catroux's proclamation to the inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon. These are now to be sovereign and independent peoples, and can either form themselves into separate states or unite in a single state. Their status is to be guaranteed by a treaty with Free France; and, should they support and join the Allies, they are assured by the British Government of all the advantages enjoyed by free countries who are associated with them. In the words of the declaration: "The blockade will be lifted, and you may enter into immediate relations with the sterling bloc, which will give you enormous, besides immediate, advantages from the point of view of your exports and imports. You will be able to sell your products and buy freely in all free countries." As this is not a war-time promise, but a definite offer with immediate prospects of realisation, it should appeal to the Arab peoples of Syria. Whether they choose to group themselves into one state or several is their affair, but it is unlikely that the Syrian Moslems will harmonise with the Lebanese Christians. There also arises the question whether the inhabitants of the Jebel Druse will agree to be incorporated in a Syrian Moslem state. If the Syrian mandate has not been a success, this has been partly due to the mass of difficulties which have confronted the French from the outset. It will be interesting to see how the Syrians set about solving such of these difficulties as are outstanding. In any case, they will have the support and guidance of Free France in setting their own house in order.

Let us now consider what we want to do in Syria. Our first object is to drive the Germans out of the country, and to overcome such other resistance there may be. Coupled with this is the seizure of aerodromes and other strategic points, as well as the taking over control of communications and transport. At the same time, every effort will be made to obtain the support of the local inhabitants, and to ensure for them better conditions of life. The first objectives may well be Beyrouth, Rayak and Damascus, all of which are of particular importance in their own way. Beyrouth is a good natural harbour, sheltered by the mountains of the Lebanon, and there is reason to expect a friendly attitude on the part of the Lebanese inhabitants. From Beyrouth a narrow gauge railway runs to Damascus through Rayak, where a standard gauge line runs north through Homs and Hama to Aleppo. From this point the railway continues into Turkey, and the Baghdad line runs eastward through Mosul. Beyrouth is of importance from a naval and political point of view. Rayak, besides being an important railway junction, is situated on the Bekaa Plain between the Lebanon and Ante-Lebanon, and has a large aerodrome. From a purely military standpoint Rayak is a central position of considerable strategical importance. Damascus always has been a centre of great influence

throughout the Middle East. Situated at an oasis on the edge of the Syrian Desert, this ancient and beautiful city has a political power which cannot be ignored. To Moslems it has a religious significance ; to merchants it is the greatest market between Istambul and Cairo ; to politicians it is the traditional and natural capital of Syria. Damascus is the starting-point of the Hedjaz Railway, which runs south through Transjordan to Medina, and carries large numbers of Moslems on their pilgrimage to Mecca. Indeed, it was for this purpose that the railway was built. This is also the starting-point of the desert land route to Baghdad, where the camel has in recent years been largely superseded by petrol-driven vehicles. For aerodromes this fringe of the desert has a special significance. Not only is it within easy reach of oil ; but, from an air point of view, it covers the Turkish frontier, the Mediterranean coast, and the western and north-western approaches to Iraq. For the latter purpose the aerodrome at Palmyra is of special importance, and it would be difficult to hold this with hostile forces in Damascus.

Among secondary objectives are the small harbours of Tripoli and Latakia, both of which are within easy reach of Cyprus. Tripoli is also important as being at the Mediterranean end of the French branch of the Iraq pipe line. For the same reason Homs is of strategical value, being at a point where the Rayak-Aleppo railway crosses the pipe-line. Further north, Aleppo must be regarded as a primary objective as an important railway junction near the Turkish frontier, owing to its proximity to the Turkish harbour of Alexandretta, and because of its position near the Euphrates and the north-western approach to Iraq. While Aleppo is the most distant of all the Syrian towns from a force advancing from the south, it is easily approachable from the coast, and is open to approach from the direction of Iraq. Once the northern part of Syria is occupied, close contact can be made with the Turks ; and it is no doubt our object to maintain this closely all along the line from the Mediterranean to Mosul and beyond.

It is with deep regret that the Allied forces feel compelled to make this Syrian move, but Vichy left us no other alternative. In the interests of our cause, including those of the real France, we could not afford to let Syria become an Axis base for attack on our Middle East strongholds, and for the destruction and enslavement of peoples for whose welfare we are responsible. Should we succeed in our endeavour, the day will assuredly come when France will wholeheartedly approve of what is being done. Having worked with the French during their troubles in Syria in 1925-6, I feel the position as deeply as any of my fellow-countrymen who have come to know the great spirit of the French people.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

THE DODECANESE: PAST AND FUTURE.

THE Dodecanese are a group of Greek islands situated between the islands of Samos, Crete and Cyprus, and the coast of Asia Minor. Although the name "Dodecanese" means in Greek "The Twelve Islands," actually they comprise fourteen. Their names, in alphabetical order, are : Astypalæa (Astropalia), Chalki, Kalymnos, Karpathos (Scarpanto), Kassos, Kastellorizo (Megisti), Kos, Leros, Lipso, Nisyros, Patmos, Rhodes, Symi, and Tilos (Piscopi).

The prehistoric era of these islands is connected with Cretan and Ægean civilisation. The most important and historically famous of them is the largest island, Rhodes. In 408 B.C. the inhabitants of three small cities on this island, the cities of Lindos, Ialysos and Kamiros, decided to build collectively and on the plans and under the direction of the famous architect, Hippodamus, the city of Rhodes, which became at once the capital of the Dodecanese. A brilliant era of civilisation, rich in the cultivation of letters, art, and science, flourished in the island. Dodecanesians were justly proud of such citizens as Cleobulus, the philosopher and one of the Seven Sages of Greece; Hippocrates, the father of medicine; Anthias, the comic poet; and Appelles, the famous painter—all of whom gained universal fame in the ancient world. The Rhodian school of sculpture occupies a prominent place in Greek art, and the Colossus of Rhodes was considered to be one of the Seven Wonders of the ancient world.

Rhodes, occupying a privileged geographical situation, became a great centre of trade and navigation. After the conquest of Greece by the Romans, and in order that the domination of the surrounding seas and lands could be completed, it was natural that the Dodecanese should attract the attention of the conqueror. Their subjugation achieved, Cassios, the Roman pro-Consul, slaughtered the chief and leading men and transferred 3,000 statues and all the treasures of Rhodes to Rome. On the creation of the Byzantine Empire, the Dodecanese followed the fortunes of this Eastern part of the Roman Empire. Following the decline of this Empire, the islands suffered successive misfortunes at the hands of the Saracens, Venetians, Genoese, Algerians, Arabs, and Turks.

On August 15th, 1309, the islands were conquered by the Knights Hospitallers of St. John of Jerusalem, who renamed them Sporades, taking for themselves the name of "Knights of Rhodes." The Knights, who never exceeded 600 in number, repaired with the aid of the islanders the old Byzantine forts in order to be able to hold the island and defend it against eventual invaders. When the Byzantine Empire was

finally overthrown and the neighbouring islands of Chios, Mytilene and Samos were captured by the Turks, the Knights abandoned the lesser islands and concentrated in Rhodes, whence they hoped successfully to oppose Sulieman. They were finally forced, in January 1523, to abandon even this island to the Turks, taking refuge in Malta and adopting the new name, "Knights of Malta." Although massacres in Rhodes followed their departure, the other islands of the Dodecanese, except Kos, were, owing to the fact that they had placed themselves under Sulieman's protection, granted full autonomy apart from certain taxes payable to the Turks.

In the year 1821, the islanders, enjoying a special régime under the long Turkish domination, were comparatively freer than other Greeks. Their little Commonwealth was a prosperous community, living mainly by shipping and their sponge fishing trade. The latter constitutes, even to-day, a characteristic feature of the islanders' occupations, although the modern sponge diver now wears a diving dress. In spite of their comparative prosperity, the Dodecanesians joined the other Greeks in their War of Independence and freed themselves from the Turkish rule. In 1830 the Dodecanese were therefore included within the frontiers of independent Greece, but together with Samos were exchanged with Turkey for the large island of Eubœa, which, since it adjoined the Greek mainland, was considered to be a more essential possession for the new Greece. By the 1832 Treaty of Constantinople, the islanders were permitted to emigrate to free Greece, but Capodistria, the President of Greece, wisely advised them to remain in their islands under their previous autonomous régime. They thus held a Greek advanced citadel and centre of Greek culture in the Ægean Sea, close to Crete and Samos, which at that time were also not included in the Greek Kingdom.

The Dodecanese came into the forefront of international politics during the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12. Neglected as they had been by the Turks, and almost unguarded, they fell an easy prey to the Italians. A force under General Ameglio was landed at Rhodes and after a mere skirmish (described afterwards in the Italian Press as a great battle) on the hill of Psinthos with the Turkish garrison, which did not exceed 300 men, they occupied the capital. Admiral Presbitero was in command of the Italian Fleet supporting the army of occupation. Both the General and the Admiral issued proclamations assuring the islanders that the Italians were bringing them the freedom they had aspired to for many centuries. The unfortunate Dodecanesians, lured by such promises and believing that the Italian occupation was only the prelude to union with their motherland, welcomed the new master with open arms. At the time they saw in him only a liberator.

Similar hopes, if not entirely unmingled with fears and suspicions, were cherished in Greece. Recalled by my Government from my post as First Secretary at the Greek Legation in Paris, I was sent to Rome to take up the position as *Chargé d'Affaires*. I at once found myself in an atmosphere different from that thought by my Government to be prevailing at that capital. In naval and ultra-nationalistic circles the occupation of the Dodecanese was not considered to be temporary. When in the autumn of 1912 a delegation of Dodecanesians from Egypt (where a large and important community of the islanders resided and prospered), headed by a distinguished lawyer, Georges Roussos, later Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, went to Rome to plead for a full autonomy of the islands as a preparation for union with Greece, the Italian Foreign Secretary, San Giuliano, a shrewd and erudite diplomat, bluntly refused to grant them an audience. Instead, rumours of the pure and simple annexation of the islands were circulated. I had to assume that the attitude of the Consulta was quite hostile to a Greek solution of the Dodecanese question. I could not help remembering a conversation I had some months before in Paris, when in temporary charge of the Legation there, with M. Poincaré, Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. I was instructed from Athens to request the support of France in Rome to obtain autonomy for the Dodecanese. He said to me, prophetically as it proved : " Tell your Government to abandon this idea of Dodecanesian autonomy under Italian suzerainty. Let the islands return to their former suzerain. As they are inhabited by Greeks, you may some day have them. If they remain under Italians, even in an autonomous form, they will only be abandoned after a war."

Hearing in Rome that there was some difference of conceptions between the expansionist Consulta and the more moderate and unemotional Piedmontese Prime Minister, Giolitti, on the question of the Dodecanese, I requested a mutual friend to approach him to ascertain his opinion on the rumoured annexation of the islands. This astute politician, in answer to the blunt question put to him, humorously replied (and I quote here his answer in the original Italian), " Non mancherebbe che questo. Avere deputati Greci nel Monte Citorio " (that would be the limit, to have Greek Members in the Italian Parliament). I still believe that Giolitti did not contemplate the retention of the islands ; a belief authoritatively supported by a long confidential report from Sir Rennell Rodd (now Lord Rennell), the then British Ambassador in Rome, published in the tenth volume of the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, edited by Gooch and Temperley.

In a long conversation which the Ambassador had with the Italian Foreign Secretary the latter told him

confidentially that, if the Greek Government would relinquish their claim on Northern Epirus, Italy would cede the islands to Greece. I cannot say whether San Guiliano was definitely pledging himself by such a declaration, or whether he was only in a temporary mood of conciliation and political honesty. In any case, the Greek Government never knew of this Italian promise, which would have probably eliminated from European politics the thorny question of the Dodecanese. As a matter of fact, the bases in these islands constitute the most important asset for Mussolini in his designs on Greece, his hope for a dominant position in the Eastern Mediterranean, and finally for Italian settlement in Asia Minor. I am convinced that if Italy had not been in possession of the Dodecanese and had not established strong bases there, Mussolini would not have tried to give shape to his wild dreams of conquest. It is the occupation of these islands, and their fortification, that encouraged him to enter the war, proclaiming that he would be able to expel the British Fleet from the Mediterranean and conquer Egypt.

There were, however, some statesmen of the old Italian school who felt the unjustified possession of the Dodecanese as a burden on the Italian conscience. Among them was Tittoni, a brilliant diplomat and afterwards Minister of Foreign Affairs. In friendly discussions with Veniselos, he recognised that it was not right for Italy to retain the islands. He therefore concluded in Paris, on July 29th, 1919, the Veniselos-Tittoni Agreement, by which the whole group of the Dodecanese, except Rhodes (whose future was settled later, in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres), was to be ceded to Greece.

In the following year, the Italo-Greek Treaty of Sèvres, signed on August 10th, 1920, dealt with the Dodecanese question, and settled also the future of Rhodes. According to Article I :

Italy renounces in favour of Greece all her rights and titles to the islands of the Ægean Sea occupied by her (the names of the islands, except Rhodes, followed).

Rhodes was dealt with in Article II, as follows :

The island of Rhodes and the islets depending on it will remain under the sovereignty of Italy who will grant to them within two months after the signature of the present Treaty a wide local autonomy. The Greek communities of the island will enjoy in every way the right of keeping and opening educational, charitable and benevolent institutions as well as churches and religious establishments under the jurisdiction of the Œcumenical Patriarchate. Italy undertakes to guarantee the free working of all these establishments.

Italy undertakes to allow the population of Rhodes to express its will freely on the future of the island of Rhodes on the day when Great Britain may decide to cede the island of Cyprus to Greece.

In any case the consultation of the population of Rhodes will not take place before the lapse of fifteen years after the signing of the present Treaty.

On that date the League of Nations will establish the conditions of the participation [of the population] in the plebiscite.

Secondary stipulations were provided by the other Articles of the Treaty, but the substance lies in the two Articles quoted above. The Italian Government, however, very soon changed their mind. They did not ratify this Treaty, and later formally denounced it.

Mussolini now enters the stage. At Lausanne he gave instructions to his delegates at the Conference of 1923 to oppose any favourable treatment for defeated Greece, and arrived for a short stay to supervise these obstructive efforts. Moreover, by a spectacular lack of courtesy to his colleagues, Curzon and Poincaré, he refused to meet them at Lausanne itself. He took a train to the neighbouring Montreux and invited them there to luncheon. I could not understand at the time, and I fail to understand even now, why these two prominent statesmen accepted this discourteous invitation issued by a younger and recent ruler of a less important state.

In the Treaty of Lausanne, Article 15 ceded all the Dodecanese islands to Italy, regardless of any previous Italo-Greek arrangements. I should like, however, to quote Article 16:

Turkey hereby renounces all rights and titles whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty (the Dodecanese included), and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognised by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned.

I cannot help believing that there was a kind of mental reservation in this Article, leaving the way open for arrangements to be made in the future to settle finally the question of the Dodecanese by an agreement between the other signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne, namely England and Italy. The possession of these islands by Greece had a merely sentimental aspect owing to the nationality of the population, but in the hands of a megalomaniac Italy they formed a sharp spear pointed against all other Mediterranean Powers, and particularly the vital Suez communications of England.

Curzon soon took up the question in the light of English and general interests. He approached Mussolini insistently pressing him to revive the Dodecanesian Treaty of Sèvres. I believe that private letters were exchanged, although I am unable to say that negotiations were in any way hopeful. I heard from Curzon himself the following typical anecdote dealing with the obstinacy of Mussolini on this question. Exasperated by the dilatory tactics of Rome, he summoned

the Italian Ambassador to the Court of St. James's, the Marquess della Torretta, a diplomat of the old school, timid, but a fine gentleman. He sharply questioned him why his Government were retaining the Dodecanese Islands, the population of which was purely Greek. The Ambassador, perturbed a little by Curzon's well-known patrician and patronising style, started to mutter some vague excuses and finished by saying that his Government would perhaps be disposed to waive their treaty rights in the islands, but they contemplated getting adequate territorial compensation from Greece in exchange for them. I am almost sure that Curzon realised the meaning of the Ambassador's remarks. Corfu surely constituted the compensation alluded to, but the Foreign Secretary wished to extort the word from the Ambassador himself. He rang for a secretary and asked for a large map of Greece and the *Ægean*. "Can you show me, M. l'Ambassadeur, on this map, what kind of compensation your Government has in mind?" The Ambassador, somewhat taken aback by the direct demand, started moving his finger across the map, and paused by an unfortunate chance on Athens. He gave a great opportunity to the haughty irony of Curzon. "May I assume that your Government looks to Athens as compensation for the Dodecanese?" The conversation ended here. The succeeding British Government did not continue the pressure, but dropped the controversy. May I be allowed to be frank on this point? I consider this failure in the continuity of English foreign policy as a serious error. In 1923 Great Britain had all the means, in my opinion, to settle the question of the Dodecanese according to justice and interest.

The treaty which is to seal the present war and restore human freedom and international justice to a shattered and tormented world must, apart from other redressments, assign the Dodecanese Islands to their legitimate claimant—Greece. This is an English and European as well as a Greek question. These small islands, transformed by greed and aggression into an advance post against peaceful nations, cannot remain in the hands of a potential aggressor. A repetition of past blunders will create the same dangers as we face now. The occupation of all the Greek islands in the *Ægean*, the attack against Crete and its bloody conquest, the deadly menace against Cyprus and Syria, is mainly the consequence of the fact that Mussolini was able to transform these islands, small but of great strategical importance, into impregnable fortresses. Greece alone will not be able to hold them permanently as a bulwark for defending her maritime possessions and the freedom of the seas in that part of the Mediterranean. A form of combined Anglo-Greek collaboration must be found. The guarantee of the independence and integrity of Greece, so promptly given by Great Britain on

the eve of the war, should be founded on strong immutable bases, able to resist the shocks of events. Improvisation and occasional measures have proved insufficient.

Walter Savage Landor proclaimed the truth in eloquent and prophetic words more than 100 years ago when he wrote :

An alliance with Greece would render us invulnerable in the only part of the world where we have lately shown our feebleness. We should unite to us a maritime power which within half a century would of itself be equivalent on the sea with France, and we should attract to our merchants those advantages of commerce in the Levant which at present lean towards her. The great Chatham, if he had lived in our days, would have cast on every side around him the seeds of small maritime and small constitutional states. We may extend our dominions in many ways.

Greek democracy is a true friend and a natural ally for Great Britain.

DEMETRIUS CACLAMANOS.

WILLIAM II.

WHEN Renan was nearing his end he lamented that he would be unable to watch the development of the young ruler of Germany whose personality excited the interest and to some degree the apprehensions of the world. The privilege denied to the great French scholar has been vouchsafed to us. We have watched the setting of the sun which then stood high in the heavens, and we have had over twenty years to reflect on the career which closed in November 1918. Was he, as Edward VII declared in a cruel epigram, "the most brilliant failure in history"? Was he a mere windbag? Or was he, as a few faithful friends maintain to this day, a hard-working, conscientious and peace-loving ruler, more sinned against than sinning, the innocent victim of forces beyond his control? That is the picture he paints of himself in his Memoirs, and that is the vision he used to embroider for his foreign visitors at Doorn. No ruler ever lived and died more satisfied with his own performances. When the tide of history surged past him he remained at peace with himself. He had done his best. *Ich bin doch kein böser Mensch*, he remarked to his valued friend, Sir Frank Lascelles—"I am not a bad man." He had some excellent qualities as well as some grave failings. No satisfactory biography of this complicated human being exists. That by Emil Ludwig has had the largest sale but it is less than fair. Chamier's *Fabulous Monster* is too *couleur de rose*. Nowak's history of the reign, written with the aid of the Kaiser himself, is of great interest, but only two volumes had been published when the author died.

The life of William II falls into seven chapters—his youth, the brief partnership with Bismarck, the first seven years of independent rule, the twelve years with Bülow at his side, the last five years of peace, the World War, the long eclipse. Born in 1859 he grew up in the intoxicating atmosphere of three victorious campaigns, when Bismarck bestrode Europe like a colossus, and when nothing in the arts of war and peace seemed beyond the range of the Reich. The unification of Germany, after a thousand years of foreign invasion and civil war, was hailed with heartfelt satisfaction by Germans throughout the world and by no one with more swelling pride than the young heir to the throne, who regarded the Iron Chancellor with unbounded admiration and his grandfather with affectionate reverence. All his love went to the modest old ruler who lived to a patriarchal age, while the friction with his parents cast a shadow over the family life. His father, the most attractive of the Hohenzollerns, had too much of the Weimar tradition inherited from the Empress Augusta to harmonise with the impulsive youth who found in Potsdam his spiritual home. His gifted mother, the Empress Frederick, was utterly destitute of tact and her unconcealed preference for English ideas rubbed him up the wrong way. What she thought of her first-born is revealed in the poignant volume of her letters to Queen Victoria, but the denunciation is so extravagant that it generates a slight reaction in favour of her victim. It is to the credit of William II that he contributed a Foreword of faultless dignity to a German translation of the letters, and that in old age he wrote with a detached appreciation of his parents in *My Early Life*, the most agreeable of his three books. His own differences with his eldest son gave him a new perspective as he looked back to the clash of temperaments and ideologies in his early manhood. For these formative years we must turn to the voluminous diaries of Waldersee, the ambitious intriguer who succeeded Moltke as Chief of Staff. It is not a pleasant picture. The Crown Prince was known to be stricken by incurable disease, Prince William was greedily longing for his hour to strike, and prominent people were manœuvring for position. During the ninety-nine days of the reign of the second Hohenzollern Emperor the conduct of the heir struck onlookers as tactless and unfeeling. Whether Emperor Frederick could have given a more liberal and humane tone to his country if he had succeeded to the throne soon after the foundation of the Empire is a fascinating theme for speculation. It seems unlikely, for he was not a strong character and he would scarcely have dared or perhaps even wished to dismiss Bismarck.

The second phase, 1888-90, is more correctly described as the close of the Bismarckian régime than as the opening of the new reign. The old Chancellor was so accustomed to

having his own way that he could not adapt himself to the new situation. William II was determined to make himself felt, and there were plenty of courtiers and ministers to remind him that so long as Bismarck was at the helm the Emperor was a mere puppet. His admiration ebbed rapidly and the smash came in the spring of 1890 from a combination of disagreements, domestic and foreign. The separation took place in anger, not in sorrow. The Kaiser's version is to be found in a long and vivid report to Francis Joseph, dictated within a few hours of the event. Bismarck's hate-filled story forms the third volume of his *Reflections and Recollections*, which was held back till his old master found himself in exile at Doorn. Bismarck's autocratic ways would have proved intolerable to any young ruler of spirit, yet the dropping of the pilot, symbolised in the famous Tenniel cartoon, was a disaster in the field of foreign affairs. Bismarck was a ruthless realist, but when his aim, the making of a nation-state, was achieved, he became a pillar of peace.

The third chapter, extending from 1890 to 1897, is a story of loss and gain. The Kaiser spoke cheerfully of "the new course," and it is not surprising that this young, gifted, eloquent, energetic ruler attracted the attention of the world. He made a good start by the repeal of Bismarck's anti-Socialist law of 1878, but in the more perilous field of foreign affairs it was soon apparent that the ship lacked an expert captain. Caprivi, the new Chancellor, was a soldier who knew nothing of diplomacy. Marschall, the new Foreign Minister, was a lawyer. Holstein, the brain of the Wilhelmstrasse, knew all Bismarck's secrets, but he was not quite normal. If the old Chancellor had remained in office he would have renewed the Secret Treaty with Russia which he had concluded in 1887 for three years. William II—mindful of the injunction of his dying grandfather—was quite ready to renew it, but he was overruled by his advisers, who argued that it was incompatible, in spirit if not in the letter, with the Austrian alliance. *Sic volo, sic jubeo*, he wrote in the Golden Book of Munich, and he used to assert that German policy was decided by himself alone. That was an illusion, for with the vital exception of the *Flottenpolitik* it was made by his advisers from the beginning to the end of his reign.

Russia and France had been drawing together during the closing years of the Bismarck régime, but the refusal to renew the treaty of 1887 led straight to the Franco-Russian Alliance. The old Chancellor, who was afraid of nothing else, confessed that he was haunted by *le cauchemar de coalitions*, and now the Triple Alliance was confronted by the Dual Alliance. In recommending the non-renewal of the secret treaty with Russia the Wilhelmstrasse counted on the continuance of the friendly relationship with England manifested in the Heligoland-Zanzibar deal of 1890. It was obvious, indeed, that,

when the wire to St. Petersburg was cut, it was essential to maintain the benevolent neutrality of England which had existed since the foundation of the Reich. For so long as the Island Empire remained friendly, France and Russia would scarcely risk a conflict with the Central Powers and Italy would remain a contented member of the Triple Alliance. Caprivi grasped the situation and for the moment the Kaiser was content with the Anglophil course. He respected the power and success of his mother's land, venerated his grandmother and was fascinated by the British fleet, though he cordially disliked the Prince of Wales. Unfortunately the Jameson Raid threw the directors of German policy off their balance, and the crazy Kruger telegram was hastily despatched. For the first time since the foundation of the Reich there was talk of war and, though the wound was plastered over, it never really healed. The Kaiser's assertion in his *Memoirs* that he merely followed the wishes of his advisers, Hohenlohe and Marschall, is incorrect, for he was as angry and excited as the rest. The first reaction was Italy's intimation to her allies that she could not take part in a conflict if England were on the opposite side. Almost at the same time Japan was estranged by a peremptory Three-Power summons to disgorge the choicest fruits of her victory over China. Russia was her rival and France was Russia's ally. Their unfriendly action was well understood in Tokio, but why, asked the Japanese, should Germany join in the game? The reason of course was the desire of the Wilhelmstrasse to curry favour at St. Petersburg; but since the creation of the Franco-Russian alliance such blandishments were of no lasting avail.

The fourth and most important chapter stretches from 1897, when Marschall left the Foreign Office for Constantinople, to 1909. It is commonly known as the Bülow era, for that slippery statesman, as Grey called him, guided or misguided by Holstein till the latter's resignation in 1906, was the real director of German policy far more than the master whom he adroitly flattered. But it was also the Tirpitz era, for the Grand Admiral, England's most formidable enemy since Napoleon, took office in the same year, 1897, and remained when the Chancellor fell. The essence of the Bülow-Tirpitz era was the scrapping of the wise Bismarckian tradition of limited liability. The cautious Caprivi had fallen in 1894 and Hohenlohe, the third Chancellor, Uncle Chlodwig as the Kaiser called him, was only the nominal head of the Government from 1897 till his resignation in 1900 at the age of 81. Bülow's version of those vital years is enshrined in the first two volumes of his glittering but unconvincing *Memoirs*. He was not responsible for the three costly blunders committed before his appointment, the cutting of the wire to St. Petersburg, the needless affront to Japan, and the

provocative Kruger telegram; but he bears the main responsibility for the blundering *Weltpolitik* which brought the German Empire to an end in the war of 1914.

In an age of rampant Imperialism no one could expect the strongest Power in Europe to content itself with the purely European rôle which had satisfied Bismarck, but common sense demanded that, since the hostility of France was incurable, England and Russia should not be antagonised at the same time. If *Weltpolitik* was to be the order of the day, two courses were open—the exploitation of Asiatic Turkey or the creation of a first-class fleet. The first was bound to alarm Russia, the second to estrange England. Instead of choosing one or the other, the rulers of Germany, overestimating her strength, decided to pursue both policies at once. It is not only the historian who cries aloud *Qui trop embrasse mal étreint*. Warning voices pointed out at the time that if England's naval supremacy was to be challenged, Germany must make friends with Russia, and that, if Turkey was to be brought within the orbit of Berlin by the construction of the Bagdad railway, it would be necessary to keep in with England. It is the supreme condemnation of Bülow's statesmanship that he lacked the insight or the courage to insist on a choice.

What was the Kaiser's share in these momentous decisions? With the aid of the *Grosse Politik*, which reveals the secrets of the Wilhelmstrasse from 1871 to 1914 in more than fifty volumes, we can answer the question without hesitation. His rôle turns out to be much less important than we used to believe. He chose his advisers, but once chosen they almost always got their way. There was, however, one vital exception—the *Flottenpolitik*. Here he was supreme. His grandfather's name was forever associated with the army: his own should be bound up with the creation of a fleet. He read Mahan and took the lessons of the American historian to heart. During the opening years of his reign he used to complain that "the Reichstag asses" had no feeling for sea power, and he bided his time. The Kruger telegram crisis, which revealed the inability of Germany to influence events in South Africa, brought home to the German people the urgent need of a fleet if the risky game of *Weltpolitik* was to be successfully played. In Tirpitz he found the man he needed, and he speaks more warmly of the Admiral in his Memoirs than of any of his advisers. The long story of our efforts to reach a naval agreement is told in the sixth volume of the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, edited by Gooch and Temperley, which reveals the determination of William II to tolerate no interference with his naval plans. Sir Charles Hardinge, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who accompanied King Edward to Cronberg in the summer of 1908, was instructed to have a frank talk with the host and

to suggest a limitation. He met with a blank refusal, and we never raised the subject again. There was plenty of further discussion, but the initiative was to come from the German side.

If William II bears the main burden for the alienation of England, he is more innocent in regard to worsening of relations with France. When Delcassé determined to secure French preponderance in Morocco he made a deal with Italy, England and Spain, while neglecting to make a similar bargain with Germany, despite her incontestable treaty rights and her large commercial interests in the land of the Moors. Bülow had excellent cards in his hands but he played them with astonishing ineptitude. Lying low for a year after the conclusion of the Anglo-French treaty of April 8th, 1904, he struck in the spring of 1905, first by the Kaiser's visit to Tangier, and then by the eviction of Delcassé. The blow was delivered when France's ally was staggering under her disasters in the Far East, but Germany lost far more than she gained. Propping up the rickety Sultanate at Fez for a few years by the Act of Algeciras was a very slender compensation for the tightening of the ties of the Entente Cordiale. William II had not the slightest desire to fight about Morocco, either then or in the even graver crisis of 1911, and it is regrettable that he did not assert himself in the one region where he was wiser than his Ministers. Like Bülow he supported Austria in the Bosnian crisis, though without enthusiasm, for since the failure of his Björko Pact to materialise and the creation of the Triple Entente in 1907-8 Austria was his only reliable ally.

The sixth phase begins when Bülow disappeared in 1909 as the result of his maladroit handling of the *Daily Telegraph* incident. His statement that he had not read the typescript of the interview sent to him at Norderney is generally disbelieved, and his censure of his master in the Reichstag debate was never forgiven. He revenged himself in his malicious Memoirs, and the Kaiser's version of the Bülow era is to be found in the second volume of Nowak. Both men were gravely to blame, the ruler for the alienation of England by his short-sighted *Flottenpolitik*, the Chancellor by his clumsy handling of France. Bülow claimed that, despite the immense difficulties involved in working with such an impulsive master, he left Germany stronger than he found her. The Austrian alliance, it is true, was in good repair, and a mighty fleet sailed proudly on the waters; but of the seven other Great Powers Austria alone could be counted in 1909 as a friend. William II had been sincerely attached to Bülow for many years, and his disenchantment was one of the severest disappointments of his life.

The fifth phase covers the last five years of peace. It was a relief to the Kaiser to exchange the plausible Bülow for the

honest Bethmann Hollweg, whom he had known since his youth; but there was no real intimacy, and the new Chancellor's long expositions bored his master. Moreover Bethmann, who knew nothing of foreign affairs, begged for the appointment of Kiderlen-Waechter to the Foreign Office, and William reluctantly consented to the collaboration of an able but disagreeable diplomatist whose indiscretions had lost the Imperial favour many years before. The brilliant period of the reign was over, and the Kaiser never quite recovered from the shock of the *Daily Telegraph* crisis, which deeply wounded his pride by revealing a widespread dissatisfaction with his methods of rule. Neither at home nor abroad was it a happy time. The new Chancellor's gallant attempt to rebuild the bridges to England was frustrated by his master and Tirpitz, who refused to make any substantial sacrifice of the naval programme. The Agadir crisis was clumsily handled by Kiderlen, who played with fire, as Bülow had done in 1905-6, and, like Bülow, had finally to climb down. The Kaiser's notorious disinclination for war about Morocco made the bellicose Crown Prince for a brief space the darling of the crowd. The Haldane Mission, the co-operation with England to localise the Balkan War of 1912-13, and the successful negotiations in regard to the Bagdad railway and the Portuguese colonies brought London and Berlin nearer than they had been since 1905. The Kaiser visited England for the last time in 1911. But the improvement was only superficial, for Europe continued to be racked by three major antagonisms—the Anglo-German rivalry at sea, the Franco-German feud about the Rhine provinces, and the Austro-Russian antagonism in the Balkans.

That William II deliberately unleashed the conflict in 1914 as a step to world domination is no longer believed by any scholar who has studied the voluminous evidence. The war arose out of an Austro-Russian conflict, and when Francis Joseph asked Berlin whether he could count on support after the murder of his heir at Serajevo, the Kaiser and Bethmann replied that he could. No other reply was possible, for a refusal would have devitalised if not destroyed the partnership. That Berlin thirsted for action and goaded Vienna into the fray is a legend. Vienna was exasperated by the hostility of Belgrade and by Russia's open encouragement of Pan-Serb ambitions. The negotiations were in the hands of Bethmann, who was as pacific as Grey, and even Poincaré came to admit that the Kaiser did not want the war. The tragic mistake was in allowing Austria alone to steer the ship. In entering on so perilous a course the Wilhelmstrasse should have insisted on consultation at every step. Bethmann was not up to his task, and he modestly confessed that perhaps Bülow might have been able to avert the catastrophe. On reading the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum the

Kaiser remarked that there was no longer any case for war. Unfortunately it was too late to draw back. Berchtold was resolved to cash the blank cheque he had received on July 5th.

The sixth and seventh phases call for little notice. The world had taken William II much too seriously, and the years of conflict revealed the smallness of the man. The Supreme War Lord, as he loved to call himself, shrivelled into an unsubstantial ghost, while the control passed into the hands of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. He felt his position keenly, resenting the immense popularity of the former and the rough ways of the latter. It was they who made and unmade Chancellors and Foreign Ministers while the ruler became a mere rubber stamp. What little prestige he retained disappeared when he fled across the frontier into Holland. Even Napoleon III had exposed his life at Sedan before he surrendered. The epilogue at Doorn was rendered tolerable by his untroubled conscience, his religious faith, his intellectual interests, his second marriage and the visits of old friends such as Dryander, the Court Chaplain. There were no more of the blazing indiscretions which had echoed round the world. He had passed into history and he did not fear its verdict.

His patriotism was beyond challenge and his intentions were excellent, but he never realised his unfitness to rule. His knowledge, though wide, was superficial. His judgment was singularly weak, and despite his undoubted cleverness there was a curious immaturity about him to the end. He was one of the vainest of men, revelling in the Byzantinism which was abhorrent to his father and grandfather. If he cannot be described as a good son, he was at any rate a good husband, and no scandals cling to his name. He admired the shining domestic virtues of his wife, though her intellectual limitations prevented an ideal partnership. His sons were never much to him, but his daughter, the Duchess of Brunswick, was near his heart. The most damaging portrait of the man is painted by Count Zedlitz in his diaries, *Twelve Years at the Kaiser's Court*, though he was never an intimate. We come nearest to him in the letters and reminiscences of Prince Eulenburg, the gifted and attractive Philo, perhaps the only real friend he ever possessed. He reveals himself as an eager learner in the correspondence with Houston Stewart Chamberlain, author of his favourite book, *The Foundations of the Twentieth Century*, though he was entirely free from the virus of anti-Semitism. Though he loved uniforms and talked of "We soldiers," he was fundamentally soft and unmilitary, liking to rattle the sword but not really wishing to draw it. His gift of speech was a snare instead of an asset, for he never learned to control his tongue. Lacking solidity, stability and the faculty of self-criticism, the last of the Hohenzollerns will live in history as the gravedigger of the Second Reich.

G. P. GOOCH.

ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

IN the terrible uncertainty which now surrounds both France and England, it would be well to trace our thoughts back to the varying relations between the two countries since the middle of the fifteenth century when Joan of Arc first embodied for all time the nationality of France. It is a curious story. At one moment we were fighting furiously for the dominion of India and Canada. At the next the English constitution, even the beheading of our unconstitutional king, was hailed in France as evidence of the sturdy freedom of the English people. It would be untrue to say that the two countries, near as they are and largely inhabited by the same sort of people, have always been staunch allies, helping one another as they should, in strengthening one another and spreading civilisation in the world. This has happened from time to time, and God grant that it may happen more frequently in the future. But what strikes one most in these five hundred years is the ups and downs of our relationship, the readiness to pass from fierce rivalry to passionate admiration, the division in England between those who sought their inspiration from Germany and those who thought France the first country in the world. This happened most unhappily at the time of the Franco-Prussian war when there was in England a strong body of Francophiles who urged the Government to take steps even to land an army in Brittany to help the French and prevent the humiliation of France. Yet there were stout protagonists of the Germans throughout—men like Carlyle or Kingsley. To this section of opinion the French mind seemed polished but shallow, unstable in their constitution, fickle in their tastes, and giving themselves the primacy of the world while the Germans were quietly but steadily forging ahead in all sorts of ways, except that of being agreeable to their neighbours. It is one of the major tragedies of history that we had at that time one of the weakest Governments ever known for making itself felt in international affairs. Gladstone and Granville might have prevented the torrent of blood and hatred which has flowed almost without intermission since Grammont and Bismarck provoked the war of 1870. Now we have to fight what is substantially part of the same conflict but with our partner crushed and trampled on by an enemy enormously increased in strength and ferocity.

Looking back over the five hundred years during which France and England have been influencing one another as distinct and consolidated nations, it would be an interesting task to select the points at which first one and then the other has taken the lead. We can hardly claim this for ourselves in the Elizabethan age, for Shakespeare was not recognised

as a giant till well into the eighteenth century. Even his own motherland did not acclaim him as the first of poets till after the spate of French poetry in the seventeenth century had died down. The Elizabethan age for us brought the fruition of nationalism, gave us a swarm of singing birds at home and troops of fighters and settlers abroad. It laid the foundation of the British Empire both in the East and the West. Elizabeth and Henri Quatre were good friends, but it was not a time of close intercourse between their two countries. Then comes the Golden Age of Louis XIV when France was universally regarded as the leader of fashion and mirror of the world. She far outshone England in the eyes of all civilised men. Her language was the international medium, her drama the standard of correct acting, Paris the hub of the universe. The royal families of the two countries being intermarried, there was the same sort of link between the highest grades of society in the two countries as was produced in the next century by the accession of the Hanoverians to the throne of England. But the French link in the seventeenth century was more popular and led to more effects in English life and literature.

The eighteenth century brings out most clearly the contacts and contrasts of England and France. Since the Bill of Rights the English government has been firmly established as an historic and popularly based system. At every step it has become more democratic; at the same time it has continued to look back with more love and more sense of continuity to the great stages in its growth—its ideal Alfred and its immortal Magna Charta. It was on this side that England appealed to the French philosophers, especially Montesquieu, and in the nineteenth she became the model for freely self-governing and historically-minded communities, which have now been destroyed in so many countries and are threatened everywhere. On this side she certainly gave the lead to France; in matters of pure thought it would be more difficult to strike the balance. The same period was absorbing the thought of the two giants, Descartes, a little earlier in date, and Newton, who lived well into the eighteenth century. These were the two greatest figures in the scientific pantheon which was to be built from their age to ours, and their combined glory shows the true partnership of France and England. They fit in well together as friends and partners should, and their rather diverse qualities are typical of the two nations. Descartes had the French turn for generalisation. He hoped to bring all the phenomena of nature under one simple law, and he handed on to Newton and his other successors that tool of algebraic geometry which was the necessary instrument for the progress in the mathematical view of the universe which we connect with Newton. Here Frenchmen were the

pioneers ; but it fell to the Englishman to give the proof of the first universal law of nature, and he gives it in the most old-fashioned, one might say pedantic, shape in the *Principia*. The example is typical of much in the philosophy and life of France and England during that century of revolutionary turmoil. Alas for the breach at the end of the eighteenth century with its long and desperate struggle round the figure of Napoleon !

Many Englishmen in 1789 rejoiced in the Revolution in France. Many opposed the policy of Pitt in going to war in 1793. How had it come to pass that the two countries which had been on the closest terms of social intercourse, and each of which owed the other profound and eternal intellectual debts, should have run apart in the crisis of social and governmental change and then drifted into a war which lasted twenty-two years and was followed by a reaction in both lands ? A full answer would be a history of the period and would not only include Napoleon as the *caput criminis* on the French side. Napoleon was less exclusively the cause of the wars which go by his name than Hitler is of the present conflict. In both cases there are also a multitude of national differences and in both cases the want of strong hands at the helm to keep the national ships from collision. One can, however, discern clearly in the conflict of a hundred and fifty years ago two causes which brought France and England to blows. Montesquieu and Voltaire, who did most to praise and popularise English life and thought in France, had both visited England and made a close study of what she had to teach. Voltaire stayed for three years and Montesquieu for eighteen months. They preached reform in France ; but the men who actually carried out the changes in France which make up the Revolution were of a very different temper. They had never crossed the Channel nor absorbed a dose of the English temper of continuity and compromise. Hence the violence of men like Robespierre and Danton commended the policy of Pitt in opposing them to the great majority of the English people.

There was another profoundly important point which at this time—and after—divided the partnership of England and France. In England constitutional progress had been steady, with the exception of Cromwell's work in the Great Rebellion. Men looked back to Magna Charta as the root from which all their liberties had sprung, and there had never been any considerable breach in the meetings of Parliament. Even the most autocratic of English rulers, though beloved and followed like Queen Elizabeth, had been constantly reminded that Parliament had its rights, and that, if it wished, it might do things on its own or prevent the doing of things which the sovereign might wish and Parliament disapprove. This salutary check, the foundation of the

full democracy to come, had disappeared in France in the autocratic glory of the seventeenth century. Hence the reformers in France were faced by a solid block of privileged and reactionary persons, nobles and their hangers-on, who inherited the tradition of Louis XIV and the sixteenth century. *L'Etat c'est moi* was as near a reality as possible in the autocratic days of Louis XIV; it was never true in England, where "The Estates of the Realm"—comprising the whole people—remained intact and became more and more democratic in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This fact explains the difference between France and England when both countries were moved to social and political reform in the nineteenth century. In France the changes were violent and frequently reversed. There were more than half a dozen revolutions in the nineteenth century, several of them stained with blood. This made the proud Englishman look askance at his fickle neighbour and wonder when if ever she would settle down into the staid and quietly progressive partner in the work of Western civilisation which at their best moments France and England have stood out before the world to defend.

There have been such moments down to the fall of the Third Republic, and to many thinkers it has seemed that the happiest times in both England and France were when the ties of partnership were most strongly felt. The two nations were born to be friends. England needed the lightness of touch and the charm of writing and speaking which France had gained from her longer and deeper drilling in Latin civilisation. France was far more open to the thought of the world and the visits of multitudes of men and women who looked upon her as their second fatherland. England, more shut up in herself and true to her traditions in life, thought and government, was all the time spreading her offshoots over the globe. England went to other people while other people went to France.

The expansion of the two neighbours over the world led to jealousy and almost to conflict during the nineteenth century. There was keen rivalry in Egypt and other parts of Africa. French and English fishermen almost came to blows over the cod of Newfoundland. Yet the peace was never broken after Waterloo, and in the time of the revolutionary Emperor Napoleon III relations were specially friendly with the conservative and ultra-nationalist Victoria. Three points stand conspicuous in those twenty years of Napoleonic rule—one entirely good, the other two evil and in the last case disastrous. It was a wholly good thing that in 1851 the first International Exhibition was held in London which brought visitors from over the Channel as well as many other places. It seemed to augur the beginning of a new age in which the resources of science would be used more

fully for the good of mankind and all the nations would find in science their common heritage and common path of advance. The two evil things which followed were partly due to the faults of both England and France. The Crimean war should have been avoided; it was rather urged on by the warlike ambitions of an adventurer on the throne of France.

In view of the sequel in which we have lived for seventy years, the catastrophe of 1870-1 must be given the first place in the disasters which have fallen on the partnership of England and France. England had no hand in provoking the conflict, but a stronger international policy in England might have averted it and in any case prevented the disastrous consequences. We had at that time in England a Government whose watchword was the avoidance of complications abroad. No protest was made either before or after the war against the calculated and unnecessary violence of the Prussian assault or the galling brutality of the terms of peace. Gladstone foresaw, though he did nothing to prevent, the legacy of evil which the triumph of Germany at that time was doomed to produce. The official paralysis of England in this turning-point of European history was a permanent misfortune to our own country and as well as to civilisation. Such was the judgment of Frederic Harrison, one of the best-informed publicists in England, and the sequel has abundantly verified his forecast.

Had England at that time—after the fall of Napoleon III and before the Treaty of Frankfurt—made common cause with France and prevented the seizure of Alsace and Lorraine the whole course of European history would have been changed for the better. Bismarck was hesitating, and he would have shrunk from the major war in which England would have been compelled to throw her full forces and defeated the Germans as she had sixty years before defeated the greater Napoleon. It is probable that he would have made a reasonable peace. He was not possessed by the maniac passion for world-dominion which began in Germany with Wilhelm II and has been developed into the hideous shapes which we have seen under Hitler. That was the time—1871—for the two Western partners who owed so much to one another in the past to form a firm constitutional and progressive alliance which would have stabilised Western Europe and spread civilisation without any major wars throughout the world. Unhappily France had been defeated and was divided within herself by the horrors of the Commune. England was in the hands of the most non-interventionist Government she had ever had. The moment was lost and the world has suffered bitterly for it ever since.

Now again there is a crisis, more terrible than before, due partly to the internal weaknesses of France and still

more to a common and inhuman enemy who threatens the peace and happiness of the world. France has fallen and we have been driven to take hostile steps against our nearest and natural friend. It behoves us, therefore, more than ever to keep a firm grasp of the vicissitudes which have befallen that friendship in the last five hundred years and to remember that it was at our most fortunate moments that England enjoyed the same thoughts of progress and happiness as her French companion. The struggles and vacillations of Vichy are due to the pressure of the common foe, and we should, as far as possible, sympathise with those whom we cannot at the moment help and may have to oppose. The French people remain the actual enemies of the Germans and will one day return to a communion with ourselves, which so many centuries have established. How this will happen we cannot foresee. The agonies of the moment surpass anything in our common history. It is a grave mistake to treat the French as our natural enemies, as if the puppet government at Vichy represents the great French people all over the world. We should act with hope and take only such steps in the conflict as we are bound to do in our own defence. There is a French people, full of art, animation and possible friendship. The better and more friendly France will arise again and our goal should be to form such a force in the world as France, ourselves and the United States would be, if the present hideous evils could be swept away. At the moment the United States and ourselves have the first task in hand. But many freed peoples will join the combination for righteousness, and reawakened France will be one of the first to take her due place in the march of humanity to a better world.

F. S. MARVIN.

BRITAIN AND ARAB NATIONALISM IN IRAQ.

THE pro-Nazi régime of Rashid Ali in Iraq has collapsed after about two months in power and after one month of military action against British forces. The danger of a new front, established right in the "Heart of the Middle East" and in the rear of the British armies in Palestine, has been averted just in time, but not without demonstrating how even a passing menace to these regions may have a vital effect on the situation. The Germans' small-scale support can be fully explained by our interference with the time-table agreed upon between them and Rashid Ali: the prompt landing of British troops at Basrah which precipitated the revelation of Rashid Ali's true attitude, and the great delaying action of the Eastern Mediterranean which absorbed German strength

to the full. The Nazis may, however, just as well have prompted him to action though aware that they might at this stage desert him. They may have calculated that even if his *coup* were to fail they would benefit by the diversion of British troops and material; the supply of armaments to Turkey and of oil for the Mediterranean fleet through Haifa would be cut off for weeks, while the depleted oil stores of Tripoli could be refilled; the refuelling on Syrian soil of German planes in transit would provide a first hold there, later to be extended; the estrangement between Britain and Vichy would be aggravated, perhaps decisively, and Arab opinion, deeply stirred, might show the desired reaction to the painstaking efforts of German propaganda.

Whether Rashid Ali's *coup* was originally planned by the Nazis as a diversion that might develop into a major issue, or as a major issue with the certain advantage of creating a diversion, it is only by gaining control of the country that they can make use of the Mosul oil supplies and deprive the Mediterranean fleet of those from Iran; that an isolated Turkey would finally be forced to face the same choice as that which lay before Yugoslavia; that Russia would be menaced on yet another vital front; that the way to Asia would be opened by circumvention of the Straits, with almost limitless possibilities for further aggression.

Hitler's bid for Iraq is therefore likely to be repeated in the near future. The presence in the country of an active anti-British element, whose leaders, according to the terms of the armistice, are only to be interned by the Iraqi authorities, remains a problem to be faced. But Rashid Ali's *coup* also raises questions beyond the interest of the moment. The fact that after twenty-five years of Anglo-Iraqi co-operation the Iraq national army should engage the British in battle, in order to put their country at Hitler's disposal, is the first example of the Nazis' successful wooing of Eastern nationalism. As such the Rashid Ali episode will figure in many future discussions on imperial policy.

The story of modern Iraq, like that of modern Egypt, begins with a clash between foreign empires interested in its strategic importance and potential wealth. About a century had elapsed between Napoleon's Egyptian campaign, which roused the ancient land from the drowsiness which Ottoman administration had cast upon the Arab countries, and William II's Berlin-Bagdad policy, with the ensuing British-German rivalry which again placed Mesopotamia on the map as a country with a future as well as a past. When at last in 1918 Iraq's future fate came to be reshaped, the conception of the right of self-determination for all peoples had reached its zenith. So from the very outset we meet in Iraq a less convinced imperialism opposed by a lively and uncompromising nationalism. No wonder, perhaps, that Iraq nationalists

to-day are watching the present gigantic struggle between great empires, preoccupied by a fixed desire to free themselves from the last remains of foreign influence within their countries. It is difficult to comprehend, however, that sincere nationalist leadership could have sought help from the very quarter whence there could come nothing but contempt for the idea of fundamental equality of rights for all peoples, weak and strong alike. Yet the fact remains that, though long-established influence and privileges retained in the treaties put Britain in a strong position which justified itself in Egypt, radical nationalist opposition against the British privileges provided German propaganda with the opportunity it successfully seized in Iraq.

The Iraq "betrayal in the hour of need" will furnish an argument for those opposed to the release of Eastern countries from British control. It may be pointed out in reply that Iraq was granted her independence grudgingly and restricted by treaty obligations. There is, however, no proof, either that Iraqi nationalism would not have yielded to a firm rule even without the employment of Nazi methods, or that a spontaneous and unrestricted fulfilment of nationalist demands would not have been repaid with loyalty. In fact, British policy in Iraq, though clearly representing a novel experiment of imperialist self-restraint, must still be regarded as a compromise between these two alternatives.

When, towards the end of the last war, Iraq had passed into British hands, many assumed that the exploitation of the alleged fabulous potential wealth of the country might well contribute towards paying the cost of the war. There was then in Mesopotamia, a Cinderella even among the misruled Ottoman provinces, a very small educated class, which, taking into full consideration the Arab's keenness and ability, seemed hardly strong enough to shoulder unaided the formidable task of rebuilding. From the very outset, however, there was a strong current of opinion in this country against an application of the old imperialist policy in the case of Mesopotamia. Throughout the early years the *Times* as well as the *Manchester Guardian* advocated more liberal Anglo-Iraqi relations. In the minds of a large section of the British public the outbreaks of 1920 testified to the failure of Sir Arnold Wilson's somewhat forceful administrative methods. A public demand arose for the complete liquidation of the Mesopotamian venture, to which the martyrdom of the defenders of Kut and the sacrifices during the rebellion provided a sinister background. Mr. Churchill, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, determined the future direction of policy at the Cairo Conference of 1921. "Our policy in Mesopotamia," he said, "is to reduce our commitments . . . while at the same time honourably discharging our obligations and building up a strong and effective government

which will always be the friend of Britain." Henceforth, there could scarcely be any doubt that Great Britain had no further interests in Iraq except the negative ones of preventing interference from any other power in a region of vital strategic value to her empire. Step by step the government of the country was entrusted to Arab hands. In 1932 Iraq was granted her independence, symbolised according to the fashion of the time by her admission as a member state to the League of Nations. The treaty of alliance ruling Anglo-Iraqi relations was designed to combine the safeguarding of British air bases and oil interests in Iraq with a minimum of interference in her sovereignty.

Britain's imperial record in Iraq—economic and political—can bear a critical scrutiny. Fifteen years of British tutelage have firmly established Iraq on the way to material progress. Under Ottoman rule she had degenerated into a giant cemetery of ancient civilisations, a desert with a few oases of cultivation and with an undisciplined tribal population. To-day she has risen to a place of prominence among the North-Arab countries. In an Arab federation of the future she might well be able to hold her own beside Syria, until recently so greatly her superior. Yet radical nationalism, deriving its strength from a permanent negativism, would take a different view of things. Habbaniyah, which has figured in many recent press reports, may serve as an example. At Habbaniyah there is not only the R.A.F. base where the British-trained Iraqi army first attacked their former instructors, but also the site for the Habbaniyah escape which is to be a corner-stone of the country's irrigation system, and on which work had only recently been resumed. To the nationalist, the fact that it had not been built by the British long ago, although work on it had already been started, according to Sir William Willcocks' plans, on the eve of the last war, illustrates the hollowness of the British idea of trusteeship. We shall justly but vainly point out that our very policy of *laissez-faire* in matters of economic development enabled Iraq, unlike Egypt, to go the healthier though slower way of relying on its own resources.

The three treaty air bases are actually all that Britain retained after voluntarily handing over the instruments of control to the Iraqis as a special concession to nationalist sensitiveness. The base at Habbaniyah had been removed there from the neighbourhood of Bagdad. To the nationalist, the continued existence of British air bases on Iraqi soil proves that the Anglo-Iraqi treaty represents only a more subtle form of imperialist domination.

Whilst in Egypt foreign economic penetration, and in Palestine Jewish immigration, acted as constant irritants, in Iraqi it is possible to watch Arab nationalism *in natura*. The more characteristic events of the lively political scene of

independent Iraq illustrate the manner and circumstances in which radical nationalist feeling was aroused. In several of these events Rashid Ali has been an active figure. Since the death of Yassin al Hashimi he is the leader of Arab nationalism in Iraq. By virtue of his origin as well as his political career he is a man able to command a considerable following. He belongs to the family of the Naquib of Bagdad, one of the noblest in the country. By profession a lawyer, he entered the Cabinet as Minister of Justice in 1924, has held various ministerial offices, and was several times Prime Minister. He was President of the Chamber of Deputies and Senator.

In preparing his *coup* in the absence of the British Ambassador Rashid Ali used a well-tryed technique. In 1927 he and Yassin al Hashimi, the two national members of the Cabinet, chose to hand in their resignation at a moment when King Feisal and Sir H. Dobbs were negotiating in London about a reform of the Anglo-Iraq treaty of 1922. Through a leakage the stage of the London negotiations had become known in Bagdad; the two Ministers' resignation caused the whole Cabinet to follow suit and resulted in a prolonged political crisis, initiating the struggle against the treaty of 1927 and accentuating the anti-British character of nationalist propaganda. At last in 1929 the obstructionists achieved their aim, and the much abused "proviso" that Iraq should attain full sovereignty in 1932 only if "the present rate of progress in Iraq is maintained and all goes well in the interval" was abandoned.

Ten months after Iraq had been granted her independence, when King Feisal, then a very sick man, was abroad, the bestial massacres of the Assyrians were partly carried out and partly encouraged by the Iraq national army. Rashid Ali, who was then Prime Minister, drove through the streets of Bagdad by the side of Major-General Bekr Sidqi, sharing the frantic ovations offered by the crowds to the returning commander of the troops engaged in the slaughter. In Mosul the returning troops were still more wildly cheered. Some of the triumphal arches had been decorated with melons stained with blood and with daggers stuck in them, "delicately representing the heads of slain Assyrians." Bekr Sidqi addressed the masses and thanked them for their "display of the noble Arab character." Crown Prince Ghazi decorated the troops. At a reception in the Amery Garden loud cheers were raised for him, but none for the King, who had always been regarded as a British tool by radical nationalists. Rashid Ali himself was one of Feisal's keenest antagonists, even though he had come to the premiership from his post at the Royal Diwan. Cries of "Down with the British: down with the colonisers," were directed against the British Consul at Mosul, who was present in his official capacity. The press was venomously anti-British; personal friends of British

officials and residents found it prudent not to display their friendship openly.

In the course of a few years the two popular heroes of these exciting days had come to power and met their death. In October 1936 Bekr Sidqi made himself master of the country by a military *coup*, in the course of which Jafar al Askari, a friend of Britain, was treacherously murdered. In August of the following year he was shot by a soldier on Mosul Aerodrome. In April 1939 the young King Ghazi died in a motor accident. As at the time of the Assyrian clashes, rumours of British intrigues and desire for intervention had fallen upon ready ears, so there were now those willing to believe the German propaganda that the British were to blame for Ghazi's death. The British Consul was killed and the Consulate burned in anti-British mob-rioting in Mosul.

The "Iraqi revolution" of 1920 formed the basis for the anti-British turn of extreme Arab nationalism in Iraq. It rapidly overshadowed the Iraqi's memory of the common Arab-British struggle of the "Arab revolution," whilst not only English public opinion in matters touching upon the Arabs but also the official British-Arab policy continued to be influenced by the "Lawrence Legend." The anti-British "Iraqi revolution" inspired works of history and poetry, often dwelling on the crudest glorification of violence. Participation in the revolution gradually became an asset which would further the chances of a candidate for many official appointments.

The insurrection of 1920 had paved the way for a *rapprochement* on the nationalist issue of the Shiah and Sunni sects, henceforth representing, generally speaking, the political and the religious aspects respectively of the nationalist movement. To the disappointment of many Britishers who had prided themselves on possessing the loyalty of the tribes, many sheiks with their followers had participated in the outbreaks. A number of these sheiks, who had been drawn into the orbit of national politics, later became members of the Iraqi Parliament. One may go so far as to say that not only do the Iraqi owe most of their comparative prosperity to the British, but that they would hardly have gained their national unity without the provocation to resent the British presence in their country.

The nationalist groups and parties were from the outset distinguished by the importance they attached to questions of organisation and propaganda. When in 1931 they were returned to the Chamber as a small minority, they resigned under demagogic pretexts, in order to serve their cause more effectively outside Parliament by means of meetings and other forms of propaganda throughout the country. This nationalism did not halt before the Iraqi army whose development had for years been a main concern of the Iraqi

Parliament. As it grew stronger its active interference in internal politics became ever greater until—since Bekr Sidqi's successful military *coup*—it could rarely be completely suppressed. As a natural outcome of the fact that in Ottoman days the military and staff colleges in Istanbul were the gateway to a career for the sons of the upper Bagdad families, former Turkish officers formed a strong element among prominent Iraqi politicians from the outset. This resulted in many inter-connections between army and political circles. Nuri Pasha as well as Taha al Hashimi, the Prime Minister turned out of office by Rashid Ali, had both been Chief of the General Staff before they entered the Cabinet. The British reluctance to comply with the demand for an introduction of conscription created a bond of common interest, of an anti-British character, between a section of Army officers and the nationalists who had made conscription one of their main demands. More lately in the Futtuwah organisation, which according to the law of 1939 provides for compulsory military training of school children "to foster their military spirit," the army entered into regular contact with the education authorities, who in their turn are largely under nationalist influence.

The Iraq experiment in the relations between Britain and an Eastern people managed, as Sir Hubert Young points out, to reconcile two opposing methods of thought on the problem. It is largely a reflection of the difficulty in working the compromise that in relations between man and man on the spot the Iraqi complaint of lack of tact on the part of the English was not always unjustified, whilst official policy towards Iraqi grievances frequently erred in the opposite direction. The man on the spot had to administer the British rights retained and thus to face Arab resentment, whilst British Government policy would take pains to respect Iraq independence, and try to win over the antagonistic elements by tolerance and patience. In the eyes of the radical nationalist the British policy of goodwill would now lower British prestige and now serve as a proof of its alleged duplicity.

In practical administration a country with the complicated—according to the nationalist untenable—legal construction of an Arab kingdom under British mandate had to struggle continuously with all the problems of dual control. In their desire to prove that this dual control was not workable and that the British end of it should be relinquished, the Iraqis would see this "perplexing predicament," as they termed it, on every side and attribute to it all administrative difficulties. Naturally the British officials would be held responsible for all troubles, as they would be assumed to serve England's rather than Iraqi's interests.

If they were not men able to rise above the situation, the way of least resistance under these circumstances would for

many British officials be retirement behind the old acceptances of empire, colour prejudice and complacency. This would soon be discovered and bitterly resented by the Iraqis. "To all intents we were worse than vermin and as such we were trodden upon": thus a young Iraqi, referring particularly to the early years of occupation, describes his feelings, in a book written in partnership with the daughter of General Bruce Hay, Inspector General of the Iraqi Army. Yet, the recognition of any considerable volume of anti-British feeling in the country would generally be avoided by qualifications, such as that it was confined to an often unemployed section of the educated classes, or was essentially nothing but a reflection of the Arab concern about Jewish immigration into Palestine.

According to the Colonial Office, this hostility was to be attributed "not to ingratitude nor to lack of appreciation of the efforts of the Mandatory . . . but to a growing national consciousness" which was "not in itself an unhealthy sign." Though it is only in recent years that "Rotativism," considering the government as a machine for the distribution of patronage and public offices, has become a real danger in Iraq, it was believed in 1931 that the numerous Cabinet changes were due to the difficulty for an Iraqi Prime Minister "of reconciling national aspirations with mandatory obligations." The same tolerant attitude was adopted towards individual politicians. An English officer, though realising Rashid Ali's part in protecting the responsible elements after the Assyrian massacres, would still sum him up as "an honest but hot-headed man." Radical leaders would sometimes be allowed to assume a martyr's crown and at the same time continue their anti-British activity. The example of the Mufti of Jerusalem is the most striking one, but there are instances of a similar complexion in Iraq itself. On the other hand, one can point to the fact that of the members of the new Cabinet, formed to re-establish normal relations with Britain, Jamil Madfai, the Prime Minister, had been a leader of the attack on Tel Afar in the Iraqi rebellion, whilst Ridha al Shabibi as well as Jalal Baban had figured prominently in it; the latter had belonged to the radical Ahd party and had at one time been exiled for one year to the Isle of Hinjam.

Rashid Ali's pro-Nazi policy had not the whole body of nationalism behind it. The Shiah Euphrates tribes did not rise to assist him. There are indications that throughout the Arab world the events in Iraq have awakened national sentiment to the futility and pettiness of their anti-British pre-occupations, in the face of the approaching Nazi armies and all they stand for. Memories as well as forebodings should warn the Iraqis in particular. The recollection of German efficiency, as demonstrated in the exciting duel between British and German commercial methods during the Bagdad railway period, may now be translated by the faint-hearted

into a belief in German invincibility. But the Iraqi may also remember that the Germans then planned to exploit Mesopotamia after a colonial pattern, and showed no concern for Arab independence, and that not only because they were the friends of their Ottoman overlords. Nazi Germany with its lack of respect for non-martial races, among which they will count the sedentary Arabs, will never consider them fit to build up a modern state.

Arab public opinion may begin to realise that the Nazis as champions of the Pan-Arab national movement are no less grotesque but far more dangerous than William II or Mussolini as Protectors of Islam. Even many nationalists begin to look upon treaty relations with Britain as the lesser evil compared to a closer contact with the totalitarian Powers. Yet it remains a task for the future to regain the full friendship of the Arabs. In planning a policy we may well realise that the never-ending concessions to nationalist demands alone will not solve our problems. So far we have allowed ourselves, to our disadvantage, again and again to be drawn into discussions on the abstract plane of nationalist reasoning, though we sometimes used the different language of practical political considerations. In order to meet the nationalists on their own ground, a positive twentieth-century version of the empire idea and of the idea of voluntary affiliation of peoples to the empire must give an added *raison d'être* to our treaty relationship with the country. The Germans developed the ideology of the New Order to make German domination more palatable to national pride. To win over Eastern peoples to our idea of free collaboration we must still more fully take into account the importance of public opinion in these countries which should and can be cultivated as carefully as the contacts with individual personalities.

ULRICH MAYER.

THE REUNION OF THE CHURCHES

I

HUMAN society maintains its unity and continuity in traditions, customs and institutions, but these are also the greatest hindrances to the progress of its thought, life and work which is a condition of its growing common good. It is probable that in no other type of society is this hindrance so effective and injurious as in religious communities or churches, where often prejudices are invested with the sanctity of principles, and preferences of obligations. Religion is more conservative than morality ; and preserves

in its doctrines and practices much that the developing conscience condemns ; creed may corrupt conscience, and approve conceptions of God and requirements of man that stand morally condemned as false and wrong. To what casuistry have theologians been driven to justify their dogmatic or ethical anachronisms ! The purpose of this article is to expose this hindrance to progress, due to religious conservatism in the relation of the Christian Churches to one another.

A comparison of the ecclesiastical with the international sphere may afford a persuasive illustration, even if to some minds it may not be a convincing argument. The recurrence of the incalculable calamity of world war after an interval of precarious peace of only twenty years is compelling many men, hitherto if not hostile yet indifferent, to recognise the clamant and urgent necessity of an international order in which " collective security " from the losses, horrors, wrongs and sins of war, and for the preservation and advancement of the higher values of human existence, should be more firmly established than in the Covenant of the League of Nations by a full acceptance by governments and peoples in practice as well as in principle of the limitation of " national sovereignty " in subordination to international obligations. While the immediate aim of this war may be the survival of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and all the values which it conserves for mankind, there are many who find a fuller inspiration to endurance, courage, and sacrifice in the vision of such an order. They labour, hope and pray that even those who are unmoved by any idealism, will be moved by the realism of what the alternative for mankind will be, if such a change is not effected. Can there be any doubt that it is the duty of the Christian Churches throughout the world to become the prophets of this vision, and even the apostles to the world of what alone in the long run and on the big scale can secure the realisation of the vision, even the conviction, that for mankind the alternative is, *Christ or Chaos* ?

In such advocacy the Churches as they now are expose themselves to the taunt, " Physician, heal thyself." The divisions in Christendom may not appear as tragic in their consequences as the divisions among the nations ; denominationalism may not seem as dangerous as nationalism is proving : for the most part the Churches are not seen to be at war with one another. It may accordingly be argued that the analogy between the two spheres does not hold ; there is no immediate necessity for the Churches to seek " collective security " by any surrender of their " denominational sovereignty." To this plea for the *status quo* the following objections can be urged :

- I. The advocates of such unity among the nations for their common safety and advantage place themselves in an

anomalous position, expose themselves to the charge of inconsistency, or even hypocrisy, if they are not prepared at the very least to give due weight to the considerations in favour of unity among the Churches.

2. If the growing solidarity of human interests and activities demands such a manifestation of unity as a new international order would afford, does not the essential nature of the Christian Church as the body of Christ, the organ of His activity in the world even more insistently demand the manifestation of its unity? This growing solidarity of mankind is the goal to which the course of human history is leading: the essential unity of the Church was initial, manifest at its starting-point, and the divisions are deviations from the course the starting-point indicates.

3. The late Dr. Shakspeare advocated reunion of the Churches, especially the formation of a United Free Church in England, on the ground that their separation involved danger to their very existence, and that their preservation demanded their union. I admit fully that the Church to-day is exposed to many perils from failures within and assaults without. Its theology is denied and derided as inconsistent with, and superseded by modern knowledge and thought; its worship is neglected as a superfluity, and not a necessity of human life by the majority in most lands; its ideal, individual and social, is opposed by rival, bitterly hostile, ideologies. Its witness is not as convincing, its worship as attractive, its service as effective, as to commend its authority, sustain its influence, and command allegiance to it of the multitude that know not their need of its ministries. But it is not the common peril that should be stressed. It is the common promise that the gates of Hades even cannot prevail against the Church and the common obligation so to order its thought, life and work as to make it most effective, so that the kingdoms of the world shall yet become the Kingdom of our God and of His Christ. There is still some unseemly controversy; there is much wasteful competition: the world outside is to a greater extent than those in the Church are ready to allow bewildered and irritated by conflicting theological and ecclesiastical claims, the convincing evidence of Christ's Saviourhood and Lordship is lacking, as long as believers do not show that they are one in Him. I for one am persuaded that the common promise cannot be fulfilled, and the common obligation met, if the body of Christ as manifested in the world is not an active and effective unity.

4. Nationalism as the sentiment of the separated nations is a product of history; and history is now pronouncing its judgment; so is denominationalism and that, too, is coming under judgment. It is this consideration I wish here to develop further.

II

The increasing recognition in the Churches of the spiritual unity of all believers in Christ, and of the one Holy Catholic Church as so imperfectly and partially manifested in the many Churches, and the desire that is spreading widely for more intimate fellowship in worship especially at the Table of the Lord, for more constant co-operation in service, for more united witness to the Gospel are not only reasons for pressing on toward the common goal of the United Church, but also a demonstration that the differences which have led to the divisions are becoming antiquated as superficial and often accidental and any advantages, which a varied presentation of the common truth, or a closer adaptation of ministries to different tastes or temperaments, or a zealous rivalry in effort may have possessed, if at all, are being paid for too dearly to be now justified. The differences are losing their significance, and the conscientious obligation to divide which these differences were supposed to impose is being less recognised, not from a deplorable loss of denominational loyalty, but because the process of history, whether we call it progress or not, is making them an anachronism, a mal-adjustment of the thought and life of the Churches to the actual conditions of the world to-day whatever they may have been in former days. A close scrutiny of the emergence of these differences and consequent divisions will prove that their submergence in the oblivion of the old things that are passed is not to be regretted, but welcomed as evidence that God is making all things new. Many reluctantly admit that during last century the progress in knowledge and thought, which only "panic" theology can deny, even if its gains may have been over-stated, and its losses under-rated, did involve what it is no hyperbole to describe as a theological revolution: because many things that men had made were shaken, that the things God had made might remain (Hebrews xii. 27): more were shaken than the fundamentalist admits, and more remain than the modernist accepts. It is not so widely recognised that this theological revolution does affect the ecclesiastical *status quo*, as depriving much of it of such only relative historical necessity or justification as it may have had. For this contention the following valid reasons can be offered. (1) The literary and historical criticism of the Holy Scriptures has not deprived them of their religious and moral value, has indeed for the discerning enhanced it, but certainly of their dogmatic authority as regards creeds, rituals, and politics. Scholars are coming to be generally agreed that none of the ecclesiastical 'isms, Episcopalianism, or Presbyterianism, or Congregationalism, can make claim to exclusive apostolic authority, or dominical institution, and even that the prescription of any organisation is not in accord with the spirit of the New Testament.

2. There is something less obvious and more subtle involved. The separation of the kernel—the Divine Word—from the husk, the human literature, subject to and affected by changing historical conditions in the Holy Scriptures, has involved a liberation of the human spirit in contact with the Divine Spirit from bondage to the letter; the believer is not under law but under grace, the freedom wherewith Christ makes free His “new creatures.” Appeal to the legislation of the Old Testament offers no justification for continued legalism in the Church, the subjection of freedom in the Spirit to the bondage of a rigid authority in the Christian Church. Ecclesiastically-minded persons do not take Paul seriously enough, and he surely had the mind of Christ. He, however, would not have claimed for the whole of his letters the verbal inspiration that dogmatists have assigned to them, and assumed in basing the authority of their interpretations upon texts quoted from them. Many theological differences, which have hitherto divided, are now recognised as having only relative claim to acceptance, and certainly not the absolute that would justify mutual separation among believers in the one Saviour and Lord.

3. The methods and the temper of science have been applied to history, not always with the necessary modifications which the difference of subjects involves. Biology may have modified the Darwinian hypothesis; but the doctrine of evolution has not been discredited as one of the most fruitful principles to guide the explanation of history as well as nature. Eternal reality may be present and active in historical movements, and may be, and has been there discovered, or rather for religious belief has disclosed itself, and yet the products of history as such have value relatively to each age, not validity for all times. The Bible contains and conveys the Word of God, but is not in authority to be identified with it. The Church has contained and conveyed the Spirit of God, but at no time can its authority as infallible be identified therewith, for the guidance has come through fallible men, and even at their best their utterances and actions were relative to the needs and the dangers of their times and they themselves subject to the influence of their environment. Differences and resulting divisions that had justification in one place at one time may have lost it altogether elsewhere and elsewhen. To give one instance: I am convinced not as a sectarian but as a student of history seeking to be unprejudiced and impartial in judgment, that the Separatists or Independents were justified in claiming independence of queen and bishops, and separating themselves from the National Church, without tarrying for any in the necessary task of Reformation, and that in so doing they vindicated the principle of the personal liberty and responsibility of the believer in Christ valid always and everywhere;

but I do not regard the kind of polity they were led in the circumstances of their time to adopt, as necessarily the best under conditions different from theirs. I am loyal to Congregationalism now, not because I make any exclusive claim for it as a polity, but because, as things now are it seems in principle, if not always in practice, to preserve this freedom in the Spirit from the bondage of the letter of creed or polity. Differences and divisions are temporary human expedients, and carry in themselves the seeds of their ultimate decay.

4. We must now make explicit what has been implicit in the insistence on the relativity of things historical. A man must be guided by his reason, and obedient to his conscience ; but he makes an unwarranted assumption when he claims that either his reason or his conscience is infallible with the authority of a divine oracle. Men may be, and have been, the organs of divine revelation : human discoveries of truth or duty have authenticated themselves to the reason and the conscience of others as divine disclosures. There come moral or religious intuitions that bear the witness of divine authority. God has spoken and speaks to men by men, His intimates and confidants. He who does the will can judge whether the doctrine he hears from others or himself speaks is from God. To maintain this judgment, supported by many facts, however, does not warrant the generalisation that all men have unerring judgment of truth or insight into duty and often least those who make the boldest claims. The variety of religious convictions and moral principles among sincere and devout men forbids such an assumption ; truth is one, but how manifold are the human apprehensions ; there is one right way and many wrong, and yet how the guides differ ! Kant has taught us to be less confident about human reason than theologians have often been, and psychology in exposing the mental process of rationalisation has warned us that men may deceive themselves as regards what is right or wrong. We may admire the conscientiousness of those who went out from a religious community to found another, which they hold to be more in accord with the teaching of Scripture, but we may have our doubts as to the correctness of their exegesis and even of their competence as interpreters of the Scriptures, and, therefore, of the necessity of their schism. Abandon belief in the Holy Scriptures as an infallible text-book of theology or ethics, and confidence in the qualifications of many who claim to be their interpreters, and you will find that the rise of many a sect was neither a gain for man, nor glory for God. It would be an interesting study to examine closely the history of many of the differences that have divided Christendom, as I think it would lead to the conclusion that sincere as may have been the motives, and honest the intentions, these differences arose from variant erroneous interpretations of the Holy Scriptures, and variant

endowments and equipments, often inadequate to the task of the interpreters ; and therefore, the perpetuation of the resulting divisions cannot be justified to an enlightened reason or discerning conscience.

III

This discussion may appear to have led to a negative result, a sceptical conclusion ; but that has not been the intention. As has already been indicated, I am convinced that God speaks to men by men, but the men by whom He speaks are not intolerant dogmatists or exclusive ecclesiastics, but men of humble and contrite hearts, teachable minds, sincere consciences, tolerant dispositions and consecrated lives. Controversy is not the best method of the discovery and declaration of truth. Division is not the open way, in which the Spirit of truth will guide, but a path beset by many obstacles, stones of stumbling, and rocks of offence. If in discussions about reunion all the participants could by the grace of Christ be delivered from the bondage of the rationalisation of their different traditions, customs and institutions, there might more surely come to them such freedom as would enable them to walk in the Spirit. There are values, even in the past, in all the Churches in creed, ritual, polity and service, worthy to be preserved, and those who most esteem them are warranted in guarding their preservation ; but there are values, not yet disclosed, to be sought in common aspiration and endeavour for the future. Only to revert to the analogy at the beginning, as "collective security" is placed above "denominational sovereignty," can the Churches gain the better order, which God is holding in store for those who so love Him, that they are willing to surrender all to know and do His holy and blessed Will in Christ for His body.

A. E. GARVIE.

AMERICA'S IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY.

"All things are mine," said Gold,
 "Nay, all things are mine," said Steel,
 "All things I'll buy," said Gold,
 Then spake Steel, "All things I'll take."

PUSHKIN.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL, who in his crowded and colourful career tried his hands even at bricklaying, in a recent broadcast address told Americans : "Give us the tools and we will finish the job." Tools in the literal and figurative sense of term—metal-working machinery to supplement British production for equipping our armament factories, and instruments of war like ships and 'planes, tanks

and guns. There is no doubt about America's willingness to help Britain, but will it be quick and effective? The United States surpasses all other nations in the abundance and variety of her developed material resources. But even she lacks a complete supply of all the commodities needed by industry and therefore this modern mechanised war. This fact was demonstrated in a dramatic fashion a few weeks ago when shortage of tungsten, due to cessation of arrivals from China following the temporary closing of the Burma Road—Chunking's lifeline—threatened to paralyse important sections of the American steel industry occupying a pivotal position in the country's defence programme. The Administration forthwith released enough tungsten from its strategic stockpile and averted a critical situation.

To-day, steel spells power. And the nation that has the various raw materials from which steel and alloy steels can be made, as well as the equipment for effecting their conversion, possesses the essentials for wielding power. And the American iron and steel industry illustrates to a remarkable degree the inherent strength and weakness (fortunately remediable) of the key industries of the country as a whole. Machine tools and weapons of war are mainly made of steel. Moreover, in the Four Years' War, America was the only important supply market for steel products for the Allies since the entire Belgian and major part of the French steel-works were in enemy hands. And to-day Great Britain has lost many of her important sources of supply for iron ore, steel scrap, ferro-alloys and semi-finished and manufactured steel products in Europe and North Africa, and her losses have been Germany's gains. True the steel ingot capacity of the British and Empire industry is around 19 million tons, an increase of 4 to 5 millions over the last war. Incidentally, the iron and steel industry of the Ontario centre in Canada is based on cheap and rich ore from the Mesabai range of Minnesota and coal from nearby Pittsburgh in the United States. Against the tremendous material strength of the European continent organised for aggression by the Nazis, our only unfailing and certain industrial counterpoise is the American steel industry. And America is the world's premier producer of coal, iron ore, pig iron, steel scrap, ferro-alloys, steel and special steels. And she has a handsome surplus of scrap and iron and steel products for export.

America's reserves of iron ore run into astronomical figures. The United States Tariff Commission estimated the actual reserves as exceeding 10 billion tons and potential reserves (of ores which may come into use in the next hundred years) at 84.4 billions. At the current rate of consumption the country's coal reserves should last some four centuries. The amount of steel in use, available as scrap in due course, at the end of 1938 was reckoned at 1,130 million tons. In the

twenty-five years 1913-37 the United States produced 1,327 million tons of iron ore or two-fifths of the world total. In the two decades 1919-38 the American industry consumed around 514 million tons of iron and steel scrap, which conserved five times that tonnage of iron ore, coal, limestone and other raw materials required for making steel. America also possesses abundant fluxing and refractory materials.

The United States is, however, wholly or largely dependent on foreign producers for seven out of the twelve most important metals used in making steel or alloy steels or in providing corrosion resistant coats to steel. She has practically no tin, nickel or cobalt and is deficient in manganese, chromium, tungsten and vanadium. Of the total world consumption America normally accounts for 50 per cent. of nickel, 45 per cent. of tin, 40 per cent. of chromite, 20 per cent. of manganese, and 10 per cent. of cobalt. From a strategic point of view the lack of a ton of *manganese* ore is just as important as the lack of eighty tons of steel. It is indispensable for the production of steel in its finished form, and every time new steel is made the manganese needed must be met from current domestic production or imports or drawn from accumulated stocks. Nearly nine-tenths of the metal is consumed in the production of ordinary steels, special manganese alloy steels, or in foundry work. *Chrome* ranks next to manganese in regard to tonnage required and has important metallurgical, refractory and chemical applications. Chromium and its salts are vital for the production of stainless steel for naval construction, armour-plate and armour-piercing projectiles, tanning leather, dyeing military clothing, etc. Compared to manganese or chromium the amount of *nickel* needed is small, but the qualities imparted by it to steel are such that it has acquired an importance out of all proportion to the quantity involved. Moreover, the field for nickel substitutes is severely circumscribed. Apart from an exceptionally wide range of industrial applications the metal or its alloys are vital for armour-plates, gun forgings, and as catalyst for accelerating chemical reactions in industry. While manganese is employed in the production of all steels and chromium and nickel have found their way into a wide variety of ferrous and other alloys, the applications of *tungsten* are confined to a few special types of steel—high-speed tool steels and super-hard cutting tools—which are of incalculable war-time value. *Molybdenum*, in which America dominates the world market, is a satisfactory partial substitute for tungsten and is also esteemed in the construction of highly stressed parts of motor vehicles, aero-engines, drilling, pumping, oil-refining and steam-generating equipment. Many metal-cutting and magnetic steels and all stellite alloys need *cobalt*, which is also a versatile catalyst. *Vanadium* is a valuable substitute for molybdenum in certain industrial fields and is an indispensable

catalyst for making strong sulphuric acid—the “life-blood” of chemical industry—by the contact process. Before steel stole *tin's* thunder cannon made of bronze, an alloy of tin and copper, was in universal service. To-day, fighting forces carry their iron rations in tin cans. As bearing and type metals tin alloys serve the transport and printing industry.

America would be industrially sterile and militarily impotent without an assured supply of these seven strategic metals. The co-operation of all other Western hemisphere countries would, barring nickel and vanadium, only partially cover her deficiency in them. Excepting for imports of sizeable tonnages of tin ore, manganese, chrome and tungsten from Bolivia, Russia, Turkey and China (now coming via Burma Road) respectively, the United States is largely dependent upon the countries of the British Empire, the Dutch East Indies and Belgian Congo for her tin and steel-hardening metals. Many months ago Mr. Churchill remarked that the affairs of the British Empire and the United States will have to be somewhat mixed up together for mutual and general advantage. If to-day Great Britain looks to America for tools, the United States relies to a marked degree on Allied sources for many materials to make tools with. She has, thanks to the activities of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, already stored stocks of these commodities for an emergency. Domestic production of such minerals is being encouraged and the exploitation of low-grade manganese and chrome deposits of nearby Cuba, subsidised for strategic reasons.

So much for raw material supplies. Never before was the American industry able to produce a larger tonnage, greater variety or a higher quality of steel. It has a minimum of obsolete plant and equipment, all phases of steel-making having undergone revolutionary improvements in recent years. This is true of the finishing sections of the industry as well. During the past decade total expenditure on plant modernisation and expansions exceeded \$1,500 million. The 1940 steel production at 66·53 million net tons constituted an all-time high record, exceeding by 8 per cent. the previous peak of 1929. And rated capacity for the output of ingots and castings was stepped up from 81·6 million net tons at the end of 1939 to over 84 millions a year later. Normal domestic industrial demand for steel this year is reckoned at 62 million short tons, and home defence requirements will absorb an additional 10 millions compared with a potential emergency capacity of 87 millions. This leaves America with a handsome surplus of between 12 and 15 million tons for exports to Britain and other neutrals who cannot adequately be served by the belligerents. Although America declared war on April 1st, 1917, it was not until the beginning of July 1918 that iron

and steel and their products were brought under complete control. In the words of Mr. Baruch, Chairman of the War Industries Board : " The iron and steel industry was, on the whole, one of the most important centres of approach to the control over the vast number of manufacturing industries which the progress of the war was making necessary." No such contingency has arisen to-day. The enormously expanded capacity of the iron and steel industry is equal to the task of meeting both defence and civilian demands as well as the requirements of Britain and other export markets. Hundreds of new coke ovens, some new blast furnaces, a number of new open-hearth and over a score of electrical furnaces are already in construction or planned. Production of alloy steels, vital for war industries, is being stepped up. Low-alloy steels are normally made in open-hearth furnaces and by Bessemer process and those with high-alloy content in the electrical furnace. And electric furnace steel-making capacity—the keystone of the arch in America's armament programme—is undergoing unprecedented expansion to provide armour-plate for tanks, warships and 'planes, stainless steel for naval construction, special steels for aircraft, automobile and machine-tool industries. In 1930-40 it has been increased by 1,022,000 net tons or nearly 60 per cent. to 2,747,000 tons. Output of alloy steels from all sources rose from 1,144,000 net tons in 1915 to 3,397,000 tons in 1937 and is certain to set up a new record this year. In arms and munitions several kinds of steel products which are almost unknown in everyday commercial use are needed in large tonnages. On the other hand the regular steels of commerce likewise play a large part in equipping land, naval and air forces. Several technical committees of the American Iron and Steel Institute were set up to supply the defence forces with the proper materials on a carefully timed delivery programme. A special committee on Government specifications has acted in an advisory capacity on ferro-alloys, shell steel, light armour-plate, hull steel, shell crate steel, aeroplane forgings, antenna wire, etc. Exclusive of stainless steels and tool steels, several thousand different combinations of chemical elements are being made to meet the individual demands of purchasers of rolled and forged steel products. These fall into two groups in regard to volume of demand, one embracing grades ordered in large tonnages and the other ordered in relatively small lots. The larger quantity group comprises some 200 grades of carbon, and alloy steels accounted for 94 per cent. of the tonnage of principal steel products manufactured in 1937, 1938 and 1939.

The American steel industry has registered great technical advances in the last twenty years. The trend has been towards fewer but larger blast furnaces, the 400-500-ton units being replaced by 1,000-1,100-ton furnaces. With the latter the linings have a longer lease of life and hold good for 2 million

tons of iron. The expansion of the steel industry's capacity has been centred on the open-hearth basic process. Increased adoption of full automatic control of fuel, air-draught pressure and temperature in the operation of open-hearth furnaces is leading to a marked elimination of the human element. Since 1935 about \$300 million of capital invested has gone into the erection of fifteen new continuous rolling mills turning out strip and sheet. The newly developed "graphitic" steel combines the free machining and resistance to wear of cast iron with the response to heat treatment and forgeability of steel. The "Brunorizing" process yields a rail which retains its ductility at low temperatures and promises to be safer than the rails hitherto used. The new method of steel treatment—austempering—imparts to ordinary carbon steel properties hitherto associated with alloy steels. Other promising developments are the application to steel of the direct rolling processes so successful with non-ferrous metals. The advances in the arts of seamless tubing and welding have made for economy and efficiency. Research is centred round improving the quality of steels employed in a variety of applications where they are subject to far more exacting demands than ever before and reducing costs of production. The results achieved are partly indicated by the fact that the estimated average useful life of various steel products has risen from twenty years in 1920 to 35·5 in recent times. And when a steel is produced having greater strength and other desirable properties fewer tons only will be required to serve a given purpose. Replacement is deferred and therefore less new steel is needed.

Of late, steel has diversified its markets and thereby minimised its risks since consumers' goods suffer less drastic fluctuations than capital goods. To-day structural shapes, rails, bars, pipe, etc., so-called heavy sections, are in less demand relatively than ingot steel in the form of sheet, strip, plate and wire. In the sixteen-year period 1923-37, the three major users of steel were the railroad, automobile and construction industries and they consumed 50 per cent. of all rolled steel products. Finished rolled steel taken by containers rose from 3·68 to 8·71 per cent., and by machinery 2·63 to 4·88 per cent. Not so very long ago a cessation in railroad, heavy construction, machinery and industrial equipment buying spelt a sharp decline in steel output; of late, a slump in steel has come to mean a reflection of the general public buying attitude.

The plant, property and raw material investment in the industry aggregates about \$5 billion before provision is made for depreciation and depletion, and nearly \$3 billion net after making those provisions. For the decade ending in 1939 the steel industry earned only 1·8 per cent. on the money invested and 4·2 per cent. in 1939 despite the boom conditions

prevailing during the last quarter. Last year it employed 550,000 workers, or 20 per cent. more than in 1929, and its payroll of \$950 million was 13 per cent. above the 1929 level. Hourly wage rates were 30 per cent. greater in comparison.

Since 1920 exports of American iron and steel products have not maintained their former rate of increase, have fluctuated widely and at times slumped sharply. In the two decades 1919-38 the net foreign trade (exports minus imports) in steel scrap totalled 14.9 million gross tons and pig iron and steel products 30.7 millions. Normally about 7 per cent. of the saleable semi-finished and manufactured steel products are exported. But last year the proportion rose to nearly 18 per cent., of which Great Britain took 50 per cent. In the interests of national defence a wide range of commodities and goods like machine tools, completed arms and materials which the United States either does not produce or produces in insufficient amounts are now restricted as to exports. Also, exports to Japan of steel scrap, iron ore, pig iron, iron and steel manufactures, ferro-alloy minerals and other metals used for making war weapons are prohibited by administrative action. Already the Japanese are selling their Steel shares heavily on the Tokyo Bourse, since they fear reduced dividends due to shrunken steel business arising from an acute shortage of the necessary raw materials, especially steel scrap, for which Japan relies on America. Moreover, pig iron shipments from India are arriving in Japan in smaller quantities and at irregular intervals. In short, the two English-speaking nations produce about twice as much steel as Germany and enslaved Europe. And if the potential weight of metal they could throw into the balance against the Axis, or even the "Triangle," were the only deciding factor, the ultimate issue of the struggle could scarcely be in doubt.

V. S. SWAMINATHAN.

THE ECONOMY OF OCCUPIED BELGIUM.

OF all the occupied countries in Western Europe Belgium seems to be in the most unfortunate position. She is made the object of a double-track policy. As a defeated country she shares the lot of the other nations in distress. That is to say, she must comply with the strain of thoroughly reorganising her economic policy and changing her basic economic structure at a time when the enormous burden of the armistice and of reconstruction take heavy toll of her national resources. Her situation is further complicated by the fact that the racial division of her population—which she never fully succeeded in bridging—is maliciously used against any effort of effective reconstruction she might attempt to do.

Berlin openly favours the Flemings as "the extreme Western outpost of the Germanic race," trying to use them as a sort of Belgian Sudetens against the Walloons. This facilitates the task for the Nazis since it involves internal matters inside Belgium, and increases the general confusion of the public even beyond the very considerable extent which is characteristic of the initial stage of the "new order" everywhere.

Hitler's economic aims in Belgium have not been disclosed yet. After a year of military occupation the Germans are still avoiding any statement about their political or economic intentions. This is perhaps due to the fact that Berlin is not unanimous in this matter. The radical Nazis dream of establishing a Flemish protectorate, comprising if possible the French Département du Nord and Pas de Calais, which are at present administered by the German occupation authorities in Belgium. They dig out historical reminiscences of the Low Countries, arguing that the "Nordic-German Hansa" was the leading power in this region long before British and French influence became prevalent and that it is the German—or Flemish—mission to reconquer it "culturally and economically." Belgium is told to turn to the east instead of to the west. She is warned lest she regards the present status as transitional, trusting that it will be followed in due course by a return to the usual régime which, in the German view, has gone for good. What position in the Greater European unit will be assigned to her remains to be seen. The German approved programme of the Flemish radicals—which happens to be the declared policy of the Walloonist Rexists as well—does not contain one constructive idea in this respect. It is the well-known slogan of "war against Britain, against political Catholicism, against the Jews and Freemasonry." Not one of these battle cries will help Belgian reconstruction.

The task Belgium is confronted with is indeed enormous. The obligations imposed by the armistice form one part of it. Another is the programme for repairing the war damage and for switching over from war to peace economy. The third consists of structural changes in the economic organisation, introduced to replace a system of free international economy by one of a closed European order. Being cut off from her raw material supplies and traditional markets, she has to change her entire producing and distributing policy. The alterations already completed, or in the making, have resulted in shifts of vested interests which will have to be taken into account.

On the surface, the economic situation of Belgium seems more favourable than could be expected under the circumstances. Initial difficulties have partly been overcome. The two million Belgian refugees in France were repatriated. War damage of communications has been repaired. Economic activities were resumed throughout the country though

they are still on a restricted scale. Employment is improving, partly because of labour export to Germany. Business is mainly provided by reconstruction work and by German orders. Apart from Belgian-German trade-exchange, foreign trade, formerly an important factor in Belgian economy, almost came to a standstill. The assistance offered by the Berlin Multilateral Clearing has hardly produced any results so far.

To the superficial onlooker this may convey the wrong impression of a kind of rationed prosperity. It must not deceive us on the real situation. Belgium in fact is on the edge of bankruptcy, and the financial clauses of the armistice have greatly increased this danger. Her monetary system and her public finances are in a mess. The note circulation and the internal indebtedness are rapidly increasing. The first has risen by over 20 per cent. during the period between May 1st, 1940, and January 30th, 1941. It is not known whether this covers the total of notes issued by the new Belgian Bank of Emission and the German *Reichskreditkassen*. Central banking has abolished its traditional lines and adopted the German principles. A policy of cheap money is followed. The money and capital market shows great liquidity, thanks to the large sums spent by the army of occupation and for reconstruction, and to the capital set free by the sale of existing stocks, which cannot be replaced because of lack of imported raw material. Public finance is deteriorating and the Belgian authorities have not yet succeeded in bringing it under control. The budget for 1941—which makes no provisions for the districts of Eupen, Malmedy and Moresnet, which were incorporated into the Reich in May 1940—shows an ordinary expenditure of 10·10 milliards Belgian francs, to which 3·89 and 2·05 milliards respectively have to be added to cover expenses connected with the war, reconstruction and other purposes. The costs of occupation (roughly according to British Government figures) are not included. Neither is the 2 milliards deficit in the estimated revenue of 1940 which was covered by credit operations. In comparison to that, the budget accounts for 1940 allowed for an expenditure of 13,865 millions Belgian francs (of which 2,232 were extraordinary expenditure) and a revenue estimated at 11·648. During the first year of occupation the domestic debt has risen by well over 30 per cent., while taxation has gone up by 20 per cent. Income tax, emergency tax, the taxes on beer, tobacco, etc., are affected. Nevertheless the money and capital abundance is continuing. Bank deposits and saving accounts are rising. The stock exchanges of Brussels and Antwerp are firm and active. This facilitates credit operations of the treasury—mainly using short term treasury bonds and certificates—but does not solve the Belgian financial problem. The public is very sceptical and reserved towards any lasting investment in public securities. The ten years' reconstruction

loan of three milliards which has been opened for subscription in October, 1940, has not been subscribed fully.

The main endeavour of the Belgian authorities is concentrated on adapting agriculture, industry and trade to the requirements of the present situation. Corporative methods are introduced completely copying the German model. Agriculture as such has not suffered great war damages apart from the fact that part of last year's harvest was destroyed. 25 per cent. of the Belgian population is engaged in farming. The Belgian industrial worker is very often a holder of a few plots, of some poultry and a couple of cattle or pigs, which makes him largely self-supporting. Before the occupation, the country was self-sufficient in fruit, vegetables, dairy products and almost in potatoes. Corn, some meat, fat and fodder had to be imported. The annual Belgian food deficit amounted to 22-25 per cent. of the consumption total, though Belgian nutrition experts argue that their national agriculture produces only half of the necessary nutritive value (51 per cent.). Since the new order has been forced upon Belgium, everything is scarce. Food is strictly rationed (including bread, flour, all dairy products, meat, etc.). Coupons are required even for beer and can be used either for beer or bread supply. As Belgium, with an average annual beer consumption of 2,640 million pints (or 330 pints per head of population), was one of the largest beer consumers of the world, this part of the "new order" is certainly not popular. The new agricultural organisation, the National Agriculture and Food Corporation, has not achieved any results so far either in production, or in trade or distribution, though regional bodies and ten special production-committees are engaged in the matter.

The same can be said generally on the whole new Belgian organisation scheme. The Germans claim that the prospects for totalitarian economy are especially favourable in Belgium because the economic prosperity of the Low Countries during the Middle Ages was based on principles similar to those which totalitarian economy uses to-day. The results of the new measures however are not convincing—especially if stated in figures. However, seventeen new syndicates have been formed which are working in close contact with the corresponding committees of the Reich. Membership is not compulsory, but there are very few "conscientious objectors" since refusal of entrance is officially taken as opposition to the new order. New bodies have been created in the heavy industry, in the mining, metal, metallurgical, chemical, oil and industrial fats, leather, textile, tobacco and scrap industry. They look after both production and marketing. Special "good-offices" have been set up to organise raw material supply and distribution, a matter of extreme importance in an industrial country deficient in raw material except of coal.

Production is progressing. This applies mostly to industry

connected with reconstruction and with carrying out orders for the German industry; 1,100 reconstruction plans are under consideration before the General Belgian Reconstruction Committee. Great sums have been supplied and a considerable amount of work done. According to an official estimate 1,400 bridges, water and electricity works and 352 industrial plants were fully destroyed, 839 heavily and 1,662 slightly damaged. By now reconstruction of public utilities and roads has almost been finished. The Belgian waterways, on the cheap transport of which the competitive power of Belgian industry mostly depends, are again in working order; the Belgian river flotilla consisting of roughly 6,900 tugs and barges (1,600 were destroyed during the battles) are busy with residues of transport and the regular freight traffic (despite the fact that the Belgian seaports are idle).

Great care is taken by the occupation officials in securing co-ordination with the industry in the Reich and in preparing for German penetration in important economic units—though, officially, the executive power rests with the Belgian authorities exclusively. Business varies. Groups engaged in reconstruction work, especially in the building trade and in heavy industry, are increasing their output, whereas typical consumption industries, like textile or glass, are badly off. The output of coal is steadily rising. Plans for improving mining conditions and coal transport are under consideration. The purchase of Belgian coal interests is the object of the recently founded Union Société Charbonière, S.C. Brussels, the German Kloeckner shipowners and coal merchants Ltd., Düsseldorf, and the Hugo Stinnes Ltd., Mülheim, Ruhr, being among the principal shareholders. The newly created Sybelac (Syndicat Belge d'Acier) has replaced the old federation of Belgian steel industry (Cosibel) without much change in the leading personalities. Co-operation between this group and the German iron and steel works is particularly active. After the armistice the Reich took over the existing stores of Belgian rolled iron bought by, but not distributed to, the British. Close collaboration has developed between Otto Wolff A.G., Cologne, and the Ourgrée-Marihaye S.A., the Deutsche Stahlverein and John Cockeril, to mention the most important cases only. Sufficient ore is supplied to Belgium from Lorraine and Luxemburg, delivery having been stopped for months at the beginning of the occupation. The very efficient Belgian textile industry is encouraged to change over to substitute production. This is a slow process requiring considerable capital investment, new machinery and re-training of workers. In a few cases however the transformation has been performed and work is starting. Rather obscure is the situation in the soda and in the plate-glass industry where Belgium holds a dominating position in international production. There is reason to believe that a

considerable change of interests has taken place, but details are not yet known. They affect—if true—the Solvay and the Saint Roche concern, in both of which the Germans were anxious to control the board. The Solvay concern is dominating in the international soda production and holds important interests in the international plate-glass industry (including U.S.). Amongst others it possesses the majority of the Libbey-Owen Ltd., which owns the majority of the German Libbey-Owen works, the biggest plate-glass factories of the Reich. The Saint Roche controls the Germania A.G. and the Rheinische Spiegelglassfabriken A.G., and has a working agreement with the French Saint Gobin chemical and glass concern. Saint Roche and Saint Gobin together own between them roughly two-thirds of the German plate-glass industry. The Hermann Goering Works are reported to have taken an interest in Solvay, but there is no official confirmation of it for the time being. A great change over takes place in connection with the new anti-Jewish law and with the registration and administration of foreign (hostile) property. The plans of awarding reparations to the Flemish for damages suffered after the First World War, because of their pro-German sympathies, may cause another shift of vested interests if they happen to materialise.

The Belgians are aware that nothing much is left to them to do but comply with the new régime provisionally. They know that their fate depends on the German-French agreement and on the final outcome of the war. In Deutsch-Europa they will lose their economic independence, will be stripped of their wealth, will have to work for the benefit of Greater Germany, and are locked and barred in Hitler's new order. Can there be any doubt what they wish for?

R. H. M. WORSLEY.

THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

WHETHER the Public Schools should be encouraged to survive or not is a question which centres round two main points: one, the value of the Public School type of education as compared with other types of secondary education; two, the principle of selection by education, or in other words: How much or how little should education try to differentiate between individuals and pick out some for more responsible and some for less responsible posts?

A great deal has been written about the first point by authorities far more experienced and far more able than I. I am therefore venturing to assume that the Public School, and more particularly the Public Boarding School, has certain educational merits which are well worth preserving. The chief of these are: the importance attached to religious

training, the unique experience of community life, the subordination of the individual to the welfare of the whole, the ideal of developing fully the personality of each individual, the pursuit of culture for its own sake without relation to any political aim, the ideal of leadership, the cult of self reliance and the development of a sense of responsibility. The most striking paradox of the system is that while it is, with some truth, said to produce a type, it nevertheless produces self-reliant reflective individuals capable both of a high degree of originality and of initiative. Some opponents of the Public Schools will go so far as to deny that the system has these merits or even to deny that these merits are valuable. Such opponents are generally so prejudiced that argument with them is unfruitful. Most opponents of the Public Schools admit the validity of the merits and to some extent the claim of the system to be productive of them; but they argue that the merits can be and are already now so well reproduced by other secondary schools that the Public Schools could be abolished without serious loss, nay, with gain to the country, because their abolition would remove the evils of class discrimination in education while preserving the best of their tradition. The weaknesses of such an argument are two. Firstly, if the merits are valuable, it would be foolish to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. If kept alive and further domesticated to fit a more just social system after the war, the Public School goose may lay eggs of still greater value than ever before. Secondly, if the merits are really deep rooted already in other schools, these other schools will rapidly produce leaders and so fall under the same complaint of class discrimination as the Public School. The closing of all the Public Schools would by no means make secure the foundations of a class-less society.

The truth is that, if the goose is killed, there will be a definite loss to our national culture and traditions. Fanatical equalitarians want to abolish the Public Schools for political reasons, but they will, if they succeed in doing so, be like a man who cuts off his foot in order to cure a corn. Most of the State Secondary Schools are in sympathy with the merits at which the Public Schools aim and they add thereto merits of their own, but the Public School traditions are sometimes misunderstood, and the organisation of much secondary education may by its bureaucratic tendency prevent the full and free development of some of the most valuable features. No system which trains leaders can be abandoned without loss until the work of education has been carried so far that each individual in our society has learnt so much wisdom and sense of responsibility that every man becomes, by sheer example of his fellows, his own leader. Such an ideal improvement may take some time to encompass; in the meantime we need all the help we can get in producing pioneer

leaders in order that eventually all may become leaders. Our object should be to increase in every possible way the number of types of schools which produce good leaders. To reduce that number would merely make the problem of educational opportunity more difficult.

Now unfortunately it is just in this training of leaders that many local secondary schools are handicapped, and they may become more handicapped still if something is not done. The reason for this is partly that the traditions of leadership in these schools have not such a strong support in the home background as they have in the case of the Public Schools. The traditions of leadership have therefore in most cases to be wholly learned at the school. The chief nourishers of these traditions must be the Headmaster and Masters. Many of these are at present fully appreciative of the great ideals of leadership and personal responsibility which have for centuries inspired both the ancient Grammar Schools and the Public Schools of our country; but from the Headmaster downwards they are threatened in many secondary schools with a certain degree of regimentation which takes from them the sharpness of personal responsibility, gives them indeed greater security but cramps initiative and puts little premium on a self-reliant pioneer spirit. There is often so much waiting about to hear a decision from some committee or other before any action can be taken, that the zest for action dies like a dream. I need hardly say that this is not the fault of the Board of Education. Its policy appears to be very different. Local education authorities, especially the smaller ones, would do well to force the bit and bridle of freedom on to their Masters and make them feel the load of personal responsibility which freedom brings. One can hardly hope to go on attracting a progressive and forceful type of man if zest and initiative are not fully encouraged.

There are of course a number of people who do not attach any importance to the training of leadership. They have their own conception of leadership with which other more general ideals conflict. It is nevertheless true that one of the most valuable traditions we possess is that of putting a good man into a post and trusting him to get on with the job instead of setting a couple of spies to watch him. It is in fact faith in a sense of duty. To sneer at it as being useful for Empire building and not for the future is absurd, for it is this tradition which has converted our Empire into a commonwealth and, we hope, laid the foundations of very great progress towards world peace and justice. The Public Schools have in their organisation generally recognised this truth very fully, in fact one of the features of the system is the lack of red tape and restrictions on initiative. Sanderson of Oundle believed that in many matters only the "man in harness" was the right judge.

There is no doubt that, if our educational system is to get

the best results it can, there will have to be far more encouragement of the independence and individuality both of persons and of schools ; all great movements must begin with some individual. The Public Schools may have to give up a certain degree of their independence, but if at the same time other schools gain more, the loss would be well worth while. It would be good to see the administration of all secondary schools, having any advanced classes, reorganised to give a larger measure of independence both as regards the Staff and the Governing Body. If at the same time the Public Schools were all given the opportunity of opening their doors to State scholars from elementary schools, a great block of schools would be formed of equal status and drawing on such a wide field of the population that no class discrimination would be of any importance.

This happy thought leads us to the second main point, namely the question of how far is education to be selective. Obviously boys of merit would by competition enter these new Public Schools. Would it be fair to allow anyone to buy right of entry? In the old days, birth determined more or less what a man should be. A man nearly always followed in his father's footsteps, or at least along a neighbouring path. Now the task of selection falls more and more heavily on education. Educational success is so essential to-day for gaining a good post that some people maintain that there should be no right of purchase of advanced or better education, that all privileges in education should be distributed according to the intellectual merit of the child only. This is the idea which lies behind what is known as the " 100 per cent. Special Places system." In a number of areas this system is now the established principle of selection of pupils for secondary schools. Although it looks very just and reasonable to the casual observer, it involves a principle which is inconsistent with real democracy. In fact, the rigidity of it is almost Prussian and makes one tremble to think how swiftly any government could, if it wished to do so, adapt our educational machinery to political aims.

Under this 100 per cent. Special Places system, no child can enter a secondary school of the area unless he gains a place through a competitive examination, even if his parents are so eager that they are willing to pay the cost of his education and even if the child is fully capable of benefiting by the training of a secondary school. Such a parent recently sent his son thirty miles a day by train to a school which was under a more reasonable authority than his own. The boy had just missed a " special place," but he did extremely well at his secondary school and fully justified his parents' sacrifices.

The first fallacy of those who oppose the right of purchase is that it is only " the bloated rich with soft hands " who benefit by such a right. This is not so. Many quite poor parents would willingly pay for their sons rather than have

them excluded merely by a chancy examination at the age of eleven.

The second fallacy is that secondary education is rationed. It is not. If I buy secondary education for my son, it does not necessarily diminish the amount of secondary education for other people's sons. It may indeed increase it. A local authority has no moral right to fix an arbitrary figure of annual entry to secondary schools and refuse to sell any other additional places. It may have a moral right to say how many free places it can supply, though I doubt even that right. It certainly has no right to levy rates and then refuse to provide accommodation for such children who can pay and pass a qualifying examination. The existence of the Public Schools is at present leaving thousands of places free in our secondary schools which are filled by the sons of poorer parents. If the Public Schools were all closed to-morrow, the nation would either have to build hundreds of new secondary schools or else turn many of the sons of poorer parents out. Certainly a large number of the boys now in our Public Schools would gain competitive places in the secondary schools. An alternative, of course, would be to take the Public Schools in along with the rest, which is exactly what this article suggests.

The third fallacy is that it is the task of education to select. It is not the function of education to determine who shall go up and who shall go down, or even to try to make every one equal and alike. Its task is social and cultural in an absolute not a relative sense. Education should aim at being so organised that there is no division necessary between sheep and goats. The abominable practice of examining little boys and girls at the age of eleven or twelve and grading them then for good and all as secondary or non-secondary should be replaced by an ever-open door to advanced studies. If the State does its job properly, the fact that a rich parent wishes to spend £300 a year on his son need not hamper a poor child; in fact, it can be used to help him by contriving so that that money shall help to keep going for him institutions of value which would otherwise be closed.

A truly democratic system of education should encourage all types of schools and all types of enthusiasm and make co-operation between these types and between schools dealing with the various stages of the child's development so cordial and close that they will help each other wholeheartedly in supplying the real educational need of each child according to his individual capacities, inclinations and enthusiasms. With such an ideal in view the task of drawing the Public Schools and other schools together for mutual benefit is nothing more than a pleasantly stiff task of organisation. It is noble to level people up: that is the task of education in its widest cultural aim. It is petty to try to level people down or clip the wings of enthusiasm: that is the task of the rottenest type of demagogue.

Unconsciously some zealous reformers easily become guilty of a general tendency to level down. But surely such an extreme policy is just as much a pandering to envy as Nietzscheism is a pandering to the lust for power. Pre-eminence and leadership are not to be found only in the Will to Power. There is a leadership which finds its pre-eminence in being the servant of all, in carrying cheerfully the heaviest load of responsibility. The Public Schools which are nearly all wholly "right of purchase" schools may justly claim that they have educated many thousands of responsible leaders who are essentially servants of the public and not exploiters. Even if now and then there appears an exploiter or a snob, surely this is a curable fault, which in any case is less fatal to the health of society than the usual fruits of equalitarian fanaticism—a general inertia of spirit, a dull lack of initiative, a fear of taking a lead, a tendency to "stay put" until the mechanical hand of the all-powerful State machine pushes the cog into a new position.

Fairness in educational selection does not demand the absolute exclusion of the will and enthusiasm of parent and child. Is there any reason why a parent who chooses to send his son to a Public School should lose the benefit of the contribution from the State which he would have received if he had sent his son to a State school? It may be objected that to help richer parents in this way would be unfair. Is it unfair to give taxpayers the benefit of the taxes they pay? Is a man who builds a private road across a field told that he can build his own roads everywhere as his wealth must exclude him from the benefit of the highways? If there is anything on which people should be encouraged to spend, it is on their children.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE FACE OF THE OLD CONTINENT.

IN one respect at any rate the march of events encourages us to acknowledge the nature of certain historic changes now taking place in Europe and of the British contribution to them. During the present century the triangular relations between Germany, France and Britain have led to disturbance on so big a scale that though the ultimate effect is likely to be good (as the ultimate effect of all human affairs must be good) yet in the immediate future, according to the honest belief of many competent students, the pivot of world affairs in their constructive aspect is to be sought elsewhere. The shades of Canning may be forced to witness a new and a drastic application of his famous remark about the redressing of balances, as between the Old World and the New.

The most recent events produced by the European war are of less interest than their context. In particular the relationship of France with Britain, one of the main causes operative during the past half century of what is now taking place, has been brought to a bitter, if logical, climax. Syria was one of the mandated territories under the League of Nations set up by France and Britain after the last war. Let the words of Article 22 of the League Covenant be now recalled in their cold mockery. The mandates were "a sacred trust of civilisation"; peoples "not yet able to stand by themselves" were to be given "tutelage" by "advanced nations," etc. Within a generation, Syria was destined to become the scene of war, and the spoils of war, between the trustees themselves.

When at 2 a.m. on Sunday, June 8th, 1941, a British force under the command of General Sir Henry Wilson crossed the frontier—crossed it, that is, in a technically hostile sense—into Syria, a mandatory French territory, there took place something that called for a drastic emendation of many former pretences. An official British statement had to be issued in London on that day. Statements were made also by the Vichy Government, and by General Catroux, the latter speaking on behalf of the "Free" French forces. The British Government's statement began its explanation of the immediate circumstances by recalling that "in their decision of July 1st, 1940, His Majesty's Government stated that they would not allow Syria and the Lebanon to be occupied by any hostile Power or to be used as a base for attacks upon those countries in the Middle East which they are pledged to defend." It then gave the grounds for the present action: "In spite of this clear warning the Vichy Government, in pursuance of their policy of collaboration with the Axis Powers, have placed the air bases in Syria and in the Lebanon at the disposal of Germany and Italy, and have supplied war material to the rebel forces in Iraq. German infiltration into Syria has begun, and the Vichy Government are continuing to take measures whose effect must be to bring Syria and the Lebanon under full German control." Every word of that allegation was perfectly and clearly true. Equally true and equally to be expected in such circumstances was the British deduction: "His Majesty's Government could not be expected to tolerate such actions, which go far beyond anything laid down in the terms of the French Armistice and are in flagrant conflict with the recent declaration of Marshal Pétain that honour forbade France to undertake anything against her former allies." The statement ended with a protestation of the high motive that actuated British policy, thus: "Free French troops have, therefore, with the support of Imperial forces, entered Syria and the Lebanon at an early hour this morning. At the same time a declaration has been issued by

General Catroux on behalf of General de Gaulle guaranteeing the liberty and independence of Syria and the Lebanon and undertaking to negotiate a treaty to ensure these objects. His Majesty's Government support and associate themselves with this promise of independence."

The situation in its immediate circumstance was thus fairly presented. Since June 1940 the technical distinction between occupied and unoccupied France had in some ways been fictitious. Unoccupied as well as occupied France had been subjected to German control in the sense that the whole people were dependent upon Germany's leaving them enough food for life. On the other hand—and this was one of the remarkable instances of the often-proved truth that armed force is not the final arbiter in any human relationship—Marshal Pétain was able for nearly a year to save unoccupied France from being used belligerently in the German cause against Britain. Why? France had no arms. She had no food, unless Germany chose to let her have food. Germany desperately, urgently wanted to use the French fleet, the French bases and even French man-power, against Britain. The spectacle was of the strongest military Power on earth standing over the prostrate form of a defeated opponent and being unable to force that victim to do the victor's will. Marshal Pétain had one powerful lever to his hand. The French people trusted him. He was determined not to allow France to be used against Britain by Germany. One reason for that determination was that in capitulating to Germany in June 1940 his main motive was to spare the people of France the horrors of continued war. If he now again plunged France into the war, but on the opposite side, he would be proved to be not only a fool, but a knave. He is neither the one nor the other. There were Frenchmen, it is true, M. Laval and Admiral Darlan among them, who were willing to indulge their unfriendly feelings about Britain to the extent of waging war upon Britain by making France the new ally of Germany. If Marshal Pétain had been supported by his political colleagues in the same way as he was supported by the common people of France, there is no reason why he should not indefinitely have withstood the German pressure and preserved France from the renewed horror of war. But men like M. Laval and Admiral Darlan are the sort of men whose minds do not easily rise above the vulgar vendettas and pugnacities that characterise so many of the world's politicians. They were not the men on whom Marshal Pétain could depend for help in a difficult enterprise. Hitler worked unremittingly through those two "traitors": a true word in this context.

Marshal Pétain was undermined from within. His only shield was French opinion. M. Laval, Admiral Darlan and those who felt as they felt—and they had their following—were Frenchmen. The result was both logical and inevitable.

Marshal Pétain could not lead France, if unhappy France was divided. His long-sustained bid to keep France clear of the war's remaining phases had, it seemed, to end in failure. A new die was destined to be cast. But this further chapter in the terrible experiences of a country that is loved by all people who appreciate culture, human, intellectual and spiritual, is the delayed action of causes that are to be sought through half a century of misguided political work, in which Great Britain as well as Germany and France herself has to bear her share of the guilt. France suffers perhaps the most immediate and the most spectacular part of the misfortune that results from bad politics. But she will probably in the long run suffer less than either Germany or Britain, for Germany and Britain were the stronger parties and must therefore face the greater responsibility. As these lines are written it is not yet decided whether Hitler, Laval and Darlan are to succeed in plunging France again into war, and whether therefore Britain is to be subjected to still another formidable strain. The risk has to be faced by those men that France may be split to the extent of civil war instead.

But certain truths, of deeper import, are not thereby affected. To demand at the present stage a convincing explanation of the chaos and the horror, and in particular of the incidental French rôle in abandoning what British propaganda calls the "defence of liberty" in order to collaborate with "that bad man," is to invite some deep reflection which if it is to be fruitful must be unprejudiced. There are several answers. One of them is that the French experience is merely one aspect of a profound change that has been wrought in Europe during the present century. The fact that Europe has already probably lost her position as centre of world civilisation and that the constructive forces have shifted to the New World is one of the results that was foreseen long ago by the realist student of affairs. The first war of the century was in itself almost enough to produce such a result and did partly produce it. The second war has not only confirmed it, but has inflicted upon a moribund civilisation such savage atrocities that the new question is, not whether Europe can ever recover her former position, but whether Europe can in the immediate future pull any weight at all in world affairs. The collapse of France is merely one incident in the European cataclysm. British public opinion about foreign affairs traditionally tends to over-simplify issues. At the present time, when the issue with France is anything but simple, many British people are content to talk about "the traitors of Vichy" and to leave it at that. Has France merely abandoned the defender of liberty to ally herself with the aggressor? The existence of the Free French Force on the contrary illustrates, and in some measure proves, that France has for a long time been bitterly divided between those who

regarded the Entente Cordiale as the right policy for France and those who regarded it without qualification as a blunder. The weakness of the former school was manifested in June 1940.

What of the second school, how strong is it, and what is its argument? The war of 1914-18 followed essentially from the very spirit of the Entente Cordiale. The result of that war was to reduce France from the quality of a first-class to that of a second-class Power, according as values are measured by the standards of the political convention. A country whose population had shown no increase for half a century, and which based its foreign policy upon the hypothesis of war with a neighbour whose population was doubled in that period could hardly afford to lose nearly two million potential fathers: or nearly one-half of the male population between the ages of 20 and 40. Yet such was the result of the first war of the century. After 1918 France was a sinking country. By contrast, despite technical "defeat" in 1918, Germany went on increasing her population so decisively that when the second war started in 1939 the German people outnumbered the French by nearly two to one. The British Foreign Office of the post-1918 era consistently failed to appreciate the fact that British foreign policy was now based upon the strategy of an alliance with a weak Power for a strong purpose that could not be achieved by a weak Power. Those of us who have been in uninterrupted contact with the Foreign Office during the past quarter of a century know how intransigent (even before the Vansittart ascendancy) was the reliance of that Office upon France: and those same deluded people now have no good word for France. Yet the whole situation was clear enough to those who had eyes to see. At no time since 1918 has French controversy been free, precisely because France was weak, from the issue between the pro- and the anti-British.

The anti-British argument was based upon the calculation that a weak France might again be called upon to bear the brunt of a new German onslaught, and that Britain might again be as slow to come to the help of France as the United States is slow to come to the help of Britain. France was nearer to the enemy, and knew how long it always takes for British, as for American, opinion to act. The analogy between France and Britain, and Britain and the United States, has been appreciated more realistically on this side of the Channel since June 1940. Let us not blame France. Let us instead be realist about future probabilities. While Europe as a whole is in danger of destroying its own influence in the world, the Far East and the Far West are by the same token increasing their influence. There can be no hope of understanding what is taking place before our eyes, if we start by shutting our eyes. The case of France is of immense symbolic importance. What the leaders of so-called Free France may say is not the most important part of the evidence. The vast

bulk of the people of France at this moment are living in France. It is they who will decide the future of France. Let us stop talking facile nonsense about "treason." We had warnings enough in the French political literature of the past quarter of a century about the possibilities in France.

Monsieur Ludovi Naudeau's book for instance, "*En écoutant parler les Allemands*" (Ernest Flammarion, 1925), was a better guide to France than were the banquets at the French Embassy in London or the doctrinaire British advocates of the Entente Cordiale. In that same year another French thinker (Professor E. Vermeil of the University of Strasbourg), in his book "*L'Allemagne contemporaine*," gave this warning: "Sachons bien que le problème franco-allemande, c'est notre affaire à nous. Français et Allemands. L'Angleterre semble de plus en plus préoccupée de son empire mondial. La Russie suit de nouvelles destinées. L'Amérique et le Japon s'élançant hardiment vers l'avenir. Si nous voulons que L'Europe après avoir perdu, du fait de la guerre, son hégémonie mondiale, conserve sa place dans l'univers terrestre, faisons en sorte que la France et l'Allemagne, conscientes de la solidarité qui doit les unir en face de dangers nouveaux, en face du capitalisme anglo-saxon et du bolchévisme russe, évitent une guerre qui ne peut que les ruiner et renouvellent, par leur collaboration féconde, la figure du vieux continent." ("To be sure, the Franco-German problem is the affair of the French and the German people. England is manifestly more and more concerned with her world empire. Russia follows her new destiny. America and Japan are driving towards their own future. If we want to ensure that Europe, after losing her world leadership as a result of the war, shall maintain her place in the terrestrial universe, let us see to it that France and Germany, conscious of the solidarity that ought to unite them when presented with new dangers, with Anglo-Saxon capitalism and Russian bolshevism, shall avoid a new war which could have no other result but to ruin them and shall renew, by their fruitful collaboration, the face of the old continent.") In 1941 we in this country throw up our hands in pious horror over what we regard as the French betrayal through "collaboration" with Germany. Yet for two decades it has been a commonplace subject of argument in France.

How can we hope to fashion an intelligent policy if we persist in refusing to face facts, and persuade ourselves that a small quantity of free Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Norwegians, Danes, Belgians, Poles, Czechs, etc., are going to roll up the map of a continent? They are important, but not in a major sense. To imagine that all self-respecting nations are necessarily pro-British is to repeat the mistake we made about France. Without any doubt, Germany's domination of the many nationalities she has conquered can no more last than

can any domination of force in the end prevail over the free spirit of man. But the way out of our present entanglements is not to be found by such wishful and easy comfortings as the encouragement of Poles in London to look forward to a bigger and a better Poland (incorporating East Prussia as well as Danzig) "after victory." At the present time we have something less imaginative and more stern to do than to draw the frontiers of the new Europe. The victors may be British; but the new frontiers may not be drawn exclusively by Britain. On June 6th last, President Roosevelt made a certain statement, of which the effect was to warn Hitler that the war would continue until victory for democracy was won. Yet the United States was not at that time taking any part in the fighting. Her hands were free and her forces intact. No man can tell how those forces will be used, before we see the end of this war; but the present fact—and it is facts we need for our sustenance—is that Washington is already helping to call the tunes, but is hardly helping to pay the piper. While Germany and Britain are reducing each other's cities and industries and their citizens' health to ruin, there are three Great Powers, the United States, Russia and Japan, who are thereby being placed impregnably in the position where they, and not either Germany or Britain, may decide what is to be built upon the ruins.

What President Roosevelt said on June 6th was it is true on the face of it merely designed to squash the suggestion, at that time being freely made, that his talks with Mr. Winant (the United States Ambassador to Britain who had lately flown home to consult with the President) had had to do with the possibility of peace. "Absolutely nothing like it," he said. "Not even the tenth cousin of a peace offer (from Hitler) or anything like that." He was talking to Press representatives, and gave permission for those words of his to be quoted. The interesting thing was that he spoke with such decisive effect about a European affair, and that the men and women of Great Britain hung upon his words. Would it be going too far to say that we have reached the pass where British opinion looks to Washington as much as, even more, than to London for guidance about the prospects in an affair that is being financed, so to speak, by British lives and British welfare? This implies no fault on the part of the United States. That country is suffering too, and will suffer more. It is a question merely of facing facts.

Rudolf Hess, the Deputy Führer to Adolf Hitler, had caused some stir in these islands by an escapade that took place in the night of May 10th-11th. During that night a Messerschmitt 110 crashed not far from Glasgow. Its guns were found to be unloaded. Afterwards a human being wearing the uniform of a German officer was found to have landed by parachute from that aircraft and to have broken his ankle in the process. He

was taken to hospital in Glasgow, where he first gave his name as Horn, and later corrected it to Hess, producing various photographs of himself at different ages to prove his identity. The photographs were duly acknowledged by people who knew him personally to be photographs of Hess. Hess in person was duly recognised by such people as the real Hess. An official of the Foreign Office who had been closely acquainted with him before the war was sent up to Scotland to confirm the diagnosis and to take statements from him. Beyond the fact that Hitler's deputy had flown from Germany to Scotland in the middle of the night and in the middle of the war—a fact of truly first-class interest and importance, whatever the explanation—no information was given about it from Downing Street. For a few days, while the British people were dithering with curiosity and everybody was telling everybody that he had escaped from Germany as a rat escapes from a sinking ship, or that he had come with peace proposals from Hitler, or that he had come to induce the Duke of Hamilton to tell Churchill not to be silly and to surrender at once to Hitler, the B.B.C. and the newspapers continued to give picturesque details about Hess, his past history and the present state of his ankle, but not a word about what everybody wanted to know. On May 13th in the House of Commons, Mr. Churchill, in answer to questions, said that he had nothing to add at present to the statement he had made the evening before (which had given no information at all), “but obviously a further statement will be made in the near future concerning the flight to this country of this very high and important Nazi leader.” What such words as “the near future” may mean depends upon the sort of outlook of those who use them or construe them. In eternity there is no such thing as time at all. But nearly a month after Hess landed in Scotland, no further enlightenment having been given upon the matter from No. 10 Downing Street, and a dutiful and docile British public having almost forgotten about it, news of a negative quality was given by Mr. Roosevelt in Washington. Americans, who had not forgotten so thrilling an episode, wanted to know if Mr. Winant had taken to Mr. Roosevelt a Hitler proposal that had been brought by Hess. Mr. Churchill meanwhile maintained the closest secrecy about it. All we now know, on Mr. Roosevelt's authority, is that Hess did not bring peace proposals.

The Hess incident is a mere straw in the wind. The biggest things by their very size tend to escape notice; the Woolworth building, for instance, would not be seen by an ant on the pavement in front of it. In Britain, if we do not see it now, we shall one day see, that Anglo-American unity implies a curtailment of British sovereign competence. As the way of salvation lies through the curtailment of national sovereignty, such a beginning may not be a bad thing. The United States,

Russia and Japan : these are the countries that may have the most profound importance in the immediate future. Russia continues sphinx-like to contemplate the mutual injury of the great nations of Europe. Whatever happens to the cradle of civilisation, the cradle of Christianity, being a spiritual, not a material thing, cannot be destroyed. Wherever and however, after this war, the forces of Christianity will find their most effective channels—perhaps after all the main channels will still be found in a battered and chastened Europe—there is little doubt that the political face of a bad Europe has been changed beyond recognition. The precise nature of the change may be largely decided by the outside influences that have been given their power precisely because the European nations have abdicated it. Will Japan after all abandon the Axis and make a deal with the United States ? Japan's stake in the former war, duly achieved by British and French help, was centred in the South Pacific. The German islands north of the Equator—the Caroline, Marianne and Marshall Islands—fell to Japan under the Franco-British distribution as a mandatory trusteeship. It came to pass not only that Japan seceded from the League of Nations whose mandate in theory she administered, but that the League itself ceased to be. If Japan went on helping Germany to win this war, would she retain those former German spoils ? By contrast, if she helped the United States and Britain to defeat Germany, would she not be the more likely to receive her due compensation in the Pacific ?

These questions are being asked. Japan has not yet obeyed the Germans' behest to plunge into the war on Germany's side. There are those who would be surprised, and who are well informed enough to be entitled to such a feeling, if the end of the war found Japan on America's rather than on Germany's side. Need such an opinion imply an expectation that Russia in her turn would be found on Germany's side against Japan ? Not at all. Germany is the last combatant that Russia would willingly join, even if she were willing to join any combatant. Her main object is to keep out of the war at almost any cost, to which end she has made her friendly pacts (gestures only, not involving an alliance) with both Germany and Japan. There are those who foresee that the New World may be fashioned by a combination of the British Commonwealth, the United States, China (for the American price of a deal with Japan would necessarily include a Japanese *amende honorable* to China), Japan and Russia. If the specifically European influence in the world be destined by these great events to be reduced, whose fault would it be, if not Europe's own, for having engaged twice in living memory in a process of horrible destruction whose effect has fallen impartially on every European nation ?

GEORGE GLASGOW.

June 9th, 1941.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY.*

Mr. Algernon Cecil's books are always worth reading, for they combine wide knowledge with high intellectual distinction and a polished style. They are not least interesting to those who share neither his political convictions nor his religious beliefs. As a Catholic he regrets the Reformation, whereas most Englishmen regard the sixteenth century, in which it was the chief event, as the beginning of our greatness. As an aristocrat by blood and temperament he sees very little to admire in democracy, whereas most of his readers are inclined to regard it, despite its many disappointments, as a more hopeful and bracing experiment than any of the systems which preceded it. He gazes regretfully back towards the past. Most Englishmen, even in the midst of a life and death struggle, look to the future with some confidence that, in Browning's words, the best is yet to be. Yet, though he is a rather lonely figure, he has his part to play in our national life, for he grips his readers from the start and compels them to think.

Whatever his theme Mr. Cecil is always a preacher, in secular things as well as in things of the spirit. In his latest work he challenges us to reflect on the principles which have guided or ought to guide our foreign policy. He is no novice in this field, for his suggestive volume on *British Foreign Secretaries*, his masterly chapter on the Foreign Office in the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, and his appreciative study of Metternich, reveal both his interest and his attitude. *Facing the Facts in Foreign Policy: A Prospect and a Retrospect* contains scarcely more than a hundred pages of large print, and indeed it is rather an elaborate essay than a book; but it is full of meat. The Historic Past, the first and

* *Facing the Facts in Foreign Policy*. By Algernon Cecil. Eyre & Spottiswoode. 5s.

longest of the three chapters, carries us to the opening of the twentieth century. Though we are presented with a *causerie*, not a narrative, the author's attitude to the fundamental problems confronting our statesmen is clear enough. It might perhaps be defined as the doctrine of limited liability, plus as much of the Concert of Europe as we can get without sacrificing our freedom of decision. There is a fine tribute to Pitt. "To sit at his feet is to learn to know what England is and what is its place in Europe. From him descend alike the only two great schools of British diplomacy—the school of Castlereagh and the school of Canning, for these two were alike his pupils. Thus it may be said that on the horizon of foreign affairs his stately column is standing still and his beacon-light unquenched by smoke. There at any rate he has become no silent warder; and his voice, as it comes to us across the vale of time, is even yet as the silver sound of a trumpet." Mr. Cecil, like Metternich, prefers Castlereagh to Canning, though recent research has tended to diminish the difference between them. The rough-handed Palmerston naturally makes little appeal to him, though his significance is fully recognised. No one will disagree with the verdict that he always remained "a bit of a sixth-form boy, sure of himself, sure of his luck, sure that he knew what way things were done, and consequently cocksure what things it was best to do."

Clarendon's maxims, as summarised by Gladstone, might be taken as the message of this book. "England should not assume alone an advanced and therefore an isolated position in regard to European controversies. England, come what may, should promise rather too little than too much." It is the same gospel of the free hand that is enshrined in Salisbury's famous Memorandum of 1901, which was inspired by the unwelcome plan of an Anglo-German partnership. This doctrine of limited responsibility is rubbed in with pungent irony in a striking passage on the sentimentalism of the British people. "We are just now wisely in love with the Greeks for their valour; yet there are few things that need more careful watching with a view to the wise conduct of foreign affairs than the Englishman's habit of falling in love at first sight with one or other of the nations of Eastern Europe, more particularly in the region of the Balkans. It may be the Greeks or the Bulgars, the Serbs or the Albanians who capture his fancy, but, if he be an Englishman pure and undefiled, fall in love with one or other of them he will, and invest his chosen people, too, with all sorts of great qualities which it may or may not possess."

The second chapter, entitled "The Historic Present," laments the abandonment of our so-called splendid isolation, more accurately described as the policy of the free hand. On this great issue men will continue to differ. On the one side

it may be said that to stand alone in a world of mighty conscript armies was too great a risk to be run even by the British Empire. On the other it was obviously disadvantageous to be mixed up in the quarrels and ambitions of friends and allies. The new policy of Continentalism, as Mr. Cecil reminds us, ended in disaster. What would have happened had we continued on the old course is a matter for speculation. Perhaps we might have had to fight Germany alone. The author is on firmer ground when he laments that our victory, bought at a terrible price, failed to win the peace for which men fought and died. "The opportunity was unequalled, faith aglow, and the world expectant. If a new start be ever a real possibility, it was possible then. But British statesmen started badly, and after twenty years of effort concluded deplorably. They had prophesied much and promised more, but their performance fell short alike of their pledges to the living and their obligations to the dead." Paris was indeed the worst place to make a dispassionate settlement, and it was a gross psychological blunder to dictate instead of negotiating the terms. When, however, Mr. Cecil declares that Clemenceau's "lack of religious opinions assured the absence of any spiritual quality in the settlement," he may be reminded that the pious Foch tried to make an even more vindictive treaty and angrily denounced the Tiger for his relative moderation. He blames the Allies for "letting the Austrian Empire perish," though he does not explain how this inorganic state could have been kept alive when the Central Powers were smashed. The worst error of the victors was the neglect of the opportunity to establish some form of economic collaboration among the so-called Succession States in the Danubian basin.

Lord Cecil has recently argued in an impressive work that the greatest mistake of the conquerors was their failure to work the League of Nations and to organise the world against the recurring crime of aggression. For his cousin, though he too is an idealist, the League represented danger rather than salvation, creating hopes impossible of fulfilment and trusting to a system of collective security in which few of its members believed sufficiently to take serious risks. Mr. Cecil has a horror of biting off more than we can chew. Our futile Abyssinian policy, toying with sanctions but recoiling from their ultimate risks, deserves the sharp criticism it receives. For the policy of the following years he, like most other people, has little but blame. "Eminent Foreign Secretaries look beyond the immediate hour and are careful to see that they will not have too much on their hands in the future." Bismarck and Salisbury had little in common, but they both believed in and applied the maxim of limited liability, which their successors decided to scrap. Neville Chamberlain is blamed, first for his optimism during the phase of appeasement,

then for allowing his righteous indignation to run away with his judgment. Assuming that we had to make a stand somewhere, Mr. Cecil argues that the Ukraine or the Dardanelles would have been a better choice than Poland. "To precipitate the struggle before France and Britain were ready might doom Poland to a terrible fate and Europe to a prolonged and disastrous war. . . . Our diplomacy had wrongly estimated, not merely the resolution of Germany and the irresolution of France, but the reaction of Russia and the power of Poland. . . . Everything had the look of muddle . . . To prevent a partition of Poland if Germany and Russia, possessed of their natural and normal strength, decide upon it, is not within British capacity from generation to generation. For that reason, if for no other, the British guarantee would appear to have been an error."

The brief closing chapter, entitled "The Historic Future," which ranges discursively over wide fields of thought and action, implores us once again not to promise or attempt more than we can perform, even though such renunciation involves leaving to an unhappy fate certain peoples whom we should dearly wish to help. "We have to regain the grasp of a policy which fanciful minds and fumbling fingers have let fall. For the genius of British policy does not consist in backing France, or blocking Germany, or building palaces of peace without foundations, or complaining that the world is wicked and will not go one's way, but in taking the measure of one's strength correctly, fixing the direction of one's purpose firmly, holding the scales of justice equitably, throwing one's weight into the balance astutely, and, last but assuredly not least, envisaging all ideals realistically. Failing a diplomacy which thinks on these things and follows after them, the British citizen must expect to consume his days in trouble and his years in mourning." How easy it is to formulate such principles of statesmanship, and how difficult to apply them! What, for instance, do "the scales of justice" prescribe for rival territorial claims in Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Balkans? Mr. Cecil does not tell us, and indeed nobody can pronounce a verdict which all men will accept as just. Diplomacy is the most difficult of the arts and peace-making perhaps the hardest of its tasks.

G. P. G.

HISTORY AS THE STORY OF LIBERTY.*

This book of the famous Italian thinker deals with various problems of the method and history of historiography. These little essays reveal a consistently liberal spirit, and though the

* *History as the Story of Liberty*. By Benedetto Croce. Allen & Unwin. 1941. 12s. 6d.

aspects are not always new, the topics are clearly and sagaciously formulated. Croce, for instance, may discuss the essence of historicism, or refute certain doubts as to the possibility of historiography in general ; he may speak about the relation between philology, history, and philosophy, between historians and politicians, examine the meaning and value of moral judgment in historiography, or the attractive rôle imagination plays in it ; he may severely, but not unjustly, criticise Ranke's or Taine's way of writing history, or try to make clear to us the distinction between action and thought, between rationalism and irrationalism in history : always he knows how to attract and entertain us by the natural and vivid way in which he tackles his problems. He shows himself as a man who thinks highly of historiography. He ascribes to historical science a civilising effect and calls the noblest way of writing history that which is at once passionate and passionless, but the meanest way the official historiography of the absolutist régimes which, he says, we see reappearing in our days and which serves only to fashion fanatics and hypocrites. Historiography, as he understands it, is, so to say, something between torpid conservatism and destructive revolutionism. It does not break off relations with the past, but liberates the mind from the pressure of the past and so serves the future.

What is the meaning of history ? To answer this, Croce says, goes beyond the intellectual power of man. All the different theories of the different philosophers of history are only of mythological value, interesting but one-sided and dangerous. Yet sometimes his thoughts are of a transcendental character. When he says that he stands on a historical plane where the historical individual, the man of historical importance, does not appear as someone who chooses his path of conduct, but as someone who carries out his task as his private mission dictates it, this is a super-empirical thought, if you conceive it in a religious or in a general philosophical sense. But if Croce speaks of history as of the story of liberty, he does not pretend to add a new philosophy of history to the other ones ; he speaks of liberty only in the empirical sense of this word, he speaks of an empirical ideal. History, he says, is certainly no idyll. It is a drama in which all man's good and evil forces are struggling against each other, yet ruled by a governing thought which is good ; evil is like a stimulus in that drama. " Liberty will always live a perilous and fighting life," but it is good so. Judging by the fervent phrasing of these considerations we can imagine what Croce may think of the contrary of freedom to be seen in Italy and Germany nowadays. He rejects the resignation and despair of those who believe that liberty has now deserted the world. To argue that liberty is dead is the same as saying that life is dead, for liberty is one with truth, morality, goodness, and

poetry and can therefore never be outmoded. There is no other ideal to replace it, none which makes the hearts of men beat like it. "Thirst for liberty, fights and sacrifices for liberty, the glory of liberty emerge from every period of history." Totalitarian states, however, are instances not of total harmonious co-operation but of comprehensive and total subjection. A humane spirit permeates Croce's essays on history. On every page of this book we feel that its author has been educated by Europe and is a good European.

J. LESSER.

FEDERALISM.*

The present war has often been described as a world-wide revolution and there is little doubt that it has already brought about permanent changes in the political structure of the world, although the end of the struggle cannot be foreseen at the moment. The sovereign national state as we knew it during the nineteenth and the first quarter of the twentieth century is in a process of disintegration and obviously destined to disappear. The war has shown that no small state has the slightest chance of resistance against a powerful aggressor, and if we define sovereignty as supreme power within a national territory, the concept of sovereignty has indeed become meaningless. It may be argued that the small state never had any chance of successful resistance against an aggressive neighbour, but the history of the past three centuries shows that with the help of alliances small states have been able to maintain their independence. Little Denmark could resist Prussia in 1864 for a longer period than it took Germany to defeat France in 1940, and although she was defeated she kept her national independence. In the age of mechanical armies and air warfare the strategical position of small nations or even of large nations without adequate industrial resources has become extremely precarious. If the military position of a small "sovereign" state is precarious, its economic position is hopeless and it is bound to succumb to its economically more powerful neighbour. It is, therefore, little surprising that modern political thinkers have tried to work out a system by which cultural autonomy and security, regionalism and centralisation, can be successfully combined. It is the chief aim of Federalism to provide an organisation in which the small state, while maintaining its integrity in many important

* (1) H. R. G. Greaves, *Federal Union in Practice*, London, 1940, 5s. (2) L. Robbins, *Economic Aspects of Federalism*, Federal Tracts No. 2, 6d. (3) N. Bentwich, *The Colonial Problem and the Federal Solution*, Federal Tracts No. 3, 6d. (4) K. C. Wheare, *What Federal Government Is*, Federal Tracts No. 4, 6d. (5) C. E. M. Joad, *The Philosophy of Federalism*, Federal Tracts No. 5, 6d. (6) B. Wootton, *Socialism and Federation*, Federal Tracts No. 6, 6d. (7) Lord Lugard, *Federation and the Colonies*, Federal Tracts No. 7, 6d.

respects, becomes a part of a larger whole which is responsible for the military protection of all its members.

Most of the advocates of Federalism agree that the division of functions between co-ordinate authorities, as implied by federation, is not an ideal form of government but is at best a makeshift, and the question has often been asked why such a complicated system was ever developed. Every student of politics will, therefore, welcome Mr. Greaves' book in which the author in a very concise manner describes the historical development of federations in America, Switzerland, Canada, South Africa and elsewhere, and discusses in the light of this practical experience the chances for the future of federalism. Mr. Greaves realises that union is a very difficult affair and cannot be achieved where fundamental disagreement on matters of common concern persists. He is also convinced that federalism is incompatible with dictatorial forms of government, but he does not indicate how such a union is to be brought about in practice and which states are to take part in it. His book is essentially that of the constitutional lawyer who analyses the structure of federalism and discusses the conditions under which it can develop. It is, however, highly significant that a lawyer of Mr. Greaves' standing does not think that Federal Union is a mere ideal or a utopia impossible of fulfilment.

The Federal Tracts discuss the various aspects of Federation in simple non-technical language and represent admirable examples of political pamphlet literature. There is apparently no attempt to enforce rigid uniformity, and it is worthy of note that in the two pamphlets which deal with the colonial problem the authors, although supporters of Federalism, develop different views as to the ultimate fate of colonial possessions. We also find a liberal economist and a socialist both discussing the economic aspects of Federation. The philosophical foundations of Federalism are admirably treated by Professor Joad, whose little pamphlet can be considered as a sort of "Federal Manifesto." His last words, which perhaps contain the key to the solution of the appalling problems of our age, are worth quoting: "It may well be that Federal Union can only be achieved and the rights of the individual preserved if the enthusiasm which religious faith can generate can be harnessed in its service."

R. ARIS.

LABOUR IN GERMANY.

The ultimate test of democracy as compared with the totalitarian systems is whether it can secure to the citizens the opportunity to do a day's work in return for which payment will be adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of

living. There is no doubt that the largest part of the hold acquired by the National Socialist system amongst the masses of Germany has been due to the abolition of unemployment. That is the main proposition of Mr. Guillebaud's addition to the "Current Problems" series under the editorship of Dr. Ernest Barker, though its title is somewhat wider in scope.* The method by which that result has been partly, though by no means wholly, brought about has been intensive rearmament. The German worker may not want war merely in order to attain that result, but his faith in the organising powers of his Government justifies the hope that an alternative will be available in peace. In the meantime conditions are giving him grave cause for anxiety. The suppression of his trade organisations even to his disciplined mentality is not to his liking, and the conditions of work have been so exacting since the beginning of the war that even the German Government had to relax them. The Government of Great Britain had the same experience in spite of medical evidence being available from the war of 1914 to 1918 that unduly long hours defeated their object of increasing output.

In order, however, that the rising generation may be assured of a day's work "efforts are made to forecast the future demand for the different occupations and to guide applicants accordingly." Thus a perverted meaning is given to the phrase "vocational guidance" by the State occupying the place of God. Following the same line of thought as Hitler has explained: "Through the Labour Service we would compel every young German to work at least once with his hands and thus to contribute towards the building up of his people," Mr. Guillebaud considers that "of all the institutions in Nazi Germany the compulsory Labour Service is the one which has received the widest measure of approval from foreign observers." He also has special commendation of the housing policy as representing one of the less known but most constructive aspects and one that may well provide lessons for other countries. The work has been organised under a Central Planning Board from Berlin, but all that has been accomplished is far below what has been needed and what could have been achieved had it not been for the competing claims of rearmament. Permeating the whole of the social policy is the existence of the Secret Police who may effect a man's dismissal for political reasons having no relation to his capacity as a worker. The net result is that however excellent may be any policy its operation is wholly vitiated by Nazi methods. Nevertheless the book is suggestive and informing for English readers.

C. E. A. B.

* *The Social Policy of Nazi Germany.* By C. W. Guillebaud. Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d.

FOREVER FREEDOM.

Forever Freedom, an anthology in prose and verse from England and America (Penguin Books Ltd.), is one of the most welcome and valuable of the Pelican Books. For sixpence we may secure over two hundred pages of inspiring and magnificent utterances, skilfully selected by Colonel Wedgwood and Professor Allan Nevins. Each of the editors furnishes a brief Introduction, the former speaking from England, the latter from America. It is a commonplace that the champions of freedom take a lofty view of human nature, while the totalitarians despise the individual citizen as a creature only deserving to be ordered about. No one has a higher opinion of our potentialities than Colonel Wedgwood. "We believe in the perfectibility of human nature. We see mankind progressing throughout the ages, from the animal to the divine. And we know that freedom to choose the right for ourselves is essential to any such progress. To bring the Kingdom of Heaven upon earth, freedom is as necessary as the air we breathe." In a word, give us our chance and we shall take it—not by any means always, of course, but sufficiently often to make free institutions a success. Here are the testimonies of the poets, the statesmen, the historians. This precious little volume, a veritable treasure-house of good things, ends with quotations from recent speeches by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. In this faith we shall conquer.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

British Strategy, Military and Economic,* by Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, is a very timely little volume in the "Current Problems" series, dealing historically with the principles that have guided or should have guided the conduct of our wars from the time of Elizabeth to the end of 1918. Implicit, throughout, are principles quite as much applicable to the present war, though the Admiral, perhaps wisely, nowhere explicitly comments on the actual problems of to-day. The most interesting chapter is the last, on the nineteenth century and the war of 1914-18, for there he deals most nearly with the respective spheres of the army and the navy in our problems of offence and defence. There he points out the unfortunate effects of the successful Peninsular War and the Waterloo victory in obscuring the great part sea power had played in the struggle against Napoleon and concentrating undue attention on the army, and that merely as an instrument of defence. In amplification of this necessarily brief chapter it is useful to supplement it by Mr. Tunstall's chapter on "Imperial Defence, 1815-70", in the recently published Volume II of the *Cambridge History of the British Empire*. Sir Herbert dwells in several of his chapters on the importance of our original doctrine of

contraband and of its effective practice by our navy as a means not only of offence against our enemies but also as our most effective instrument of defence, and in company with Lord John Russell in 1856 and Lord Salisbury in 1871 regrets our acceptance of the Declaration of Paris of 1856 as seriously weakening our defensive and offensive power in war. One of the most effective passages quoted by Sir Herbert is Lord Barrington's speech on the policy of our war with the American colonists, in which he argued, rightly as it proved, that we could never subdue America by our armies, but could well have achieved the same object by blockading her coasts with our navy. Only two slips remain to be noted, on pp. 43-7, where the Elector of Bavaria in 1742 is said to have followed Frederick II's "evil example" in claiming the Imperial Crown and threatening "the integrity of the Empire." He had a perfect right to stand for election as Emperor; his real fault was to have claimed dominions of Maria Theresa contrary to the Pragmatic Sanction to which he had consented.

BASIL WILLIAMS.

* * * * *

Professor H. G. Atkins's little book, *German Literature Through Nazi Eyes* (Methuen, 6s.) is amazing reading. It is amazing and at the same time amusing to see the antics present German historians of literature are forced to perform in order to adulterate the whole of German literature with the abstruse Nazi ideology. That they call those of the contemporary writers good and great who think Nazidom to be good and great, but the others, above all Thomas Mann, fundamentally bad and untalented, goes without saying. The job is not so easy, however, with the poets of the great German past. Lessing is blamed for having been an enlightened humanitarian idealist, not caring for race. Herder, while keen on folklore, yet shows (unfortunately, as they say) humanitarian and Christian prejudices of the Enlightenment. Schiller is regarded by the official experts as Hitler's companion in arms. Goethe is most difficult to handle, but these magicians force even him into the Procrustean bed of Nazism. They try to make us believe that he had been the scientific precursor of the racial theory and pretend to be surprised at the great "spiritual affinity" between him and Hitler. They have created a new slang for all their distortions which the author strives to translate, not quite successfully though, no wonder, for the Nazi vocabulary is untranslatable. He tells us that the Nazis declare the German and the Western European spirit to be different things, because the Western Europeans have got stuck in superficial rationalism, while the new German spirit—deeper than the English—is fighting against this disease of old age, fighting, says Professor Atkins, by having renounced Europe as a whole and having returned to some vague primitive paganism of the old German tribes.

J. L.